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Abstract 
In order to improve safety in current air carrier operations, there is a growing emphasis on 
proactive safety management systems. These systems identify and mitigate risks before accidents 
occur. This thesis develops a new anomaly detection approach using routine operational data to 
support proactive safety management. The research applies cluster analysis to detect abnormal 
flights based on Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data. Results from cluster analysis are provided to 
domain experts to verify operational significance of such anomalies and associated safety hazards. 
Compared with existing methods, the cluster-based approach is capable of identifying new types of 
anomalies that were previously unaccounted for. It can help airlines detect early signs of 
performance deviation, identify safety degradation, deploy predictive maintenance, and train staff 
accordingly. 
The first part of the detection approach employs data-mining algorithms to identify flights of 
interest from FDR data. These data are transformed into a high-dimensional space for cluster 
analysis, where normal patterns are identified in clusters while anomalies are detected as outliers. 
Two cluster-based anomaly detection algorithms were developed to explore different 
transformation techniques: ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample.  
The second part of the detection approach is domain expert review. The review process is to 
determine whether detected anomalies are operationally significant and whether they represent 
safety risks. Several data visualization tools were developed to support the review process which 
can be otherwise labor-intensive: the Flight Parameter Plots can present raw FDR data in 
informative graphics; The Flight Abnormality Visualization can help domain experts quickly 
locate the source of such anomalies. 
A number of evaluation studies were conducted using airline FDR data. ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample were compared with Exceedance Detection, the current method in use by 
airlines, and MKAD, another anomaly detection algorithm developed at NASA, using a dataset of 
25519 A320 flights. An evaluation of the entire detection approach was conducted with domain 
experts using a dataset of 10,528 A320 flights. Results showed that both cluster-based detection 
algorithms were able to identify operationally significant anomalies that beyond the capacities of 
current methods. Also, domain experts confirmed that the data visualization tools were effective in 
supporting the review process. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Current Aviation Safety Level and Proactive Safety 
Management 
Aviation safety has been improving steadily over the past 50 years. The annual accident rate 
and fatal accident rate decreased significantly as shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 (Boeing 
Commercial Airplanes, 2012.) In recent years, the accident rate has been stable. As an industry 
which receives extensive public attention, the pressure on safety is always present.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Accident Rates and Onboard Fatalities by Year (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 
2012) 
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Figure 1.2 U.S. and Canadian Operators Accident Rates by Year (Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, 2012) 
  
In the past, airline safety has been improved by identifying problems after accidents. 
Accidents trigger the development and implementation of mitigation strategies (Logan, 2008). 
Further improvement of safety requires a proactive approach, in which potential hazards are 
identified and corrective actions are taken before accidents even occur.  
In recent years, the airline industry has been making several efforts towards a more proactive 
safety management system. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) participants in three 
major voluntary programs (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a) 
 Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) - A joint FAA/industry program that allows 
aviation employees to self-report safety violations to air carriers and FAA free from 
legal or disciplinary consequences. 
 Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) - A program for the routine collection 
and analysis of digital flight data generated during aircraft operations. 
 Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) - A voluntary alternative to traditional pilot 
training regulations that replaces programmed hours with proficiency-based training. 
AQP incorporates data-driven processes enabling air carriers to refine training based 
on identified individual needs. 
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Along with the implementation of voluntary safety programs, the airline industry has also 
developed a systems approach to manage risks via a systematic, explicit, and comprehensive 
process. The 2006 Advisory Circular (AC120-92) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006), titled 
Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air Operators, introduced the concept of a Safety 
Management System (SMS) to aviation service providers. The 2010 Advisory Circular (AC120-
92A) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b) provided a Framework for Safety Management 
Systems development by aviation service providers. 
The implementation of the voluntary safety programs has made progress. Meanwhile, SMS 
plans have been developed further along with other safety initiatives (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2013). All these efforts identify detailed information on hazards, processes, and 
precursor events, in order to support risk assessment and mitigation actions. They converge in one 
direction: proactive safety management.  
1.2 Current Use of Flight Data Recorder Data 
1.2.1 Flight Data Recorder 
Every aircraft is equipped with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR). Historically, it was used for 
accident investigations only. A FDR records flight parameters onboard during an entire flight. 
Typical flight parameters include altitude, airspeed, accelerations, thrust, engine pressures and 
temperatures, control surfaces etc. An example of the FDR data is shown in Figure 1.3. It displays 
a few flight parameters recorded in the last 110 seconds of the Cogan Air Flight 3407 before 
impact (NTSB, 2009).  
 
Figure 1.3 Example of Flight Data Recorder Data (NTSB, 2009) 
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Today, the recording capacity of FDR is significantly increased. The number of flight 
parameters being recorded increased significantly as shown in Table 1.1. The specification of flight 
parameters recorded and sampling rates vary by the type of recorder and the configuration 
requirements of the airline. FAA defined the minimum requirements of what flight parameters to 
be recorded and minimum sampling rates (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011) for US airlines. 
However, the recording capability on modern airplanes is much larger than the minimum 
requirements, as it was shown in Table 1.1. The FDR on Boeing 787 can record approximately 
2000 flight parameters for 50 hours (Rosenkrans, 2008). The sampling rates vary by the nature of 
the flight parameter. For example, the vertical acceleration is recorded at 8 Hz, while the outside 
air temperature is recorded at 0.5 Hz.  
Table 1.1 Evolution of FDR (N. A. H. Campbell, 2007)  
Aircraft 
Time into 
Service 
FDR Type 
Number of 
parameters 
FDR data capacity 
Boeing 707 1958 Analogue 5 Mechanical limit of ~10 parameter 
Airbus 330 1993 Digital 280 128 words per second (wps) 
Embraer 170 2004 
Digital 
Combi-recorder1 
774 256 wps 
Airbus 380 2007 Digital > 1000 1024 wps 
Boeing 787 
2009 
(first flight) 
Digital 
EAFR2 
> 1000 Ethernet system 
 
As FDR data is digitalized, it is also easier to access the data. FDR data can be downloaded 
periodically during routine operations. Therefore, it is possible to utilize FDR data from routine 
operations before accidents happen. 
1.2.2 Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program 
Program Overview 
The Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, also called the Flight Data 
Monitoring (FDM) in Europe, aims to use detailed flight data recorded during daily flights to 
improve airline operations and safety. The general process of a FOQA program consists of data 
recording, downloading, and analysis. The recording of the data happens during every flight, 
                                         
1 The combi-recorder stores both cockpit audio and flight data 
2 EAFR: Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder 
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measuring various flight parameters by airplane sensors and recording onboard using FDR. Data 
are downloaded and stored in a large database at the airline through manual retrieval or wireless 
transmission. For manual retrieval, the downloading process is performed once in several days or 
weeks when the aircraft park at a station or maintenance base. For wireless transmission, the 
downloading can be completed within 15 minutes after aircraft landing (Teledyne Controls, 2011). 
Downloaded data are analyzed by FOQA analysts to evaluate daily operations. 
Data Analysis 
Currently, analysis of FDR data is conducted by using a number of special purpose software 
programs. Details of each program may vary, yet data analysis is using two primary approaches: 
the Exceedance Detection approach and the Statistical Analysis approach (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004).  
Exceedance Detection. The exceedance detection approach detects pre-defined operationally 
undesired events. It monitors if particular flight parameters exceed the predefined limits under 
certain conditions. The list of flight parameters and the limits of those parameters need to be 
specified by safety specialists in advance. Usually, the watch list coincide with the airline’s 
standard operating procedures, such as the pitch at takeoff, the speed at takeoff climb, the time of 
flap retraction, etc. A few examples are shown in Table 1.2 (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2004).  
 
Table 1.2 Examples of Exceedance Event Parameters and Definitions (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004) 
Event Parameters Basic Event Definition Event Description 
Pitch High 
at Takeoff 
Air/Ground 
Switch, Pitch 
Air/Ground = Ground,  
Pitch > x degrees 
An event that measures pitch at takeoff in 
relation to the angle required to strike the tail 
of the aircraft 
Takeoff 
Climb Speed 
High 
CAS, Gross 
Weight, HAT 
HAT > x feet,  
HAA < x feet,  
CAS > V2 + x knots 
An event to detect climb speed higher than 
desired during the Takeoff Phase of flight 
Early Flap 
Retraction 
HAT, Flap 
Position 
HAT< x feet,  
Flap Position < Flap 
Position in the preceding 
sample 
An event to detect any flap movement from 
the takeoff position prior to reaching the 
altitude at which flap retraction should begin 
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Approach 
Speed High 
Gross 
Weight, CAS, 
HAT, Flaps 
HAT > 1000 feet, HAT < 
3000 feet, CAS > VFE - x 
knots 
HAT < 1000 feet, CAS > 
VREF + x knots 
An event to detect operation on approach 
that is in excess of its computed final 
approach speed 
Excessive 
Power 
Increase 
HAT, N1 HAT < 500 feet, Δ of 
N1 > x 
An event to detect an excessive power 
increase during final phase of approach 
Operation 
Below 
Glideslope 
Glide Slope 
Deviation 
Low, HAT 
Glide Slope Deviation 
Low > x dots, HAT < x 
feet 
An event to detect deviation below glideslope 
 
Statistical Analysis. In the statistical analysis approach, distributions of certain flight 
parameters are plotted to examine a particular flight operation. Compared with the Exceedance 
Detection, a carrier can gain a more complete picture of the operation based on the distribution of 
all flights using the Statistical Analysis. Figure 1.4 provides an example of the distribution 
analysis on “altitude at which landing flap is set”. 
 
Figure 1.4 Distribution Analysis of "Altitude at Which Landing Flap Is Set" (N. Campbell, 
2003)  
 
The current FOQA data analysis performs well on known issues. However, it is incapable in 
identifying the unknowns. Both approaches need a pre-defined watch list of key parameters under 
certain operational conditions; the Exceedance Detection requires the thresholds of key parameters 
to be precisely defined in advance. As a result, only known issues are examined; emerging risks 
will remain undetected. 
13 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This research develops an innovative approach to identify emerging risks from routine airline 
operations using FDR data, which combines the strength of data mining and the knowledge of 
domain experts: data mining techniques are applied to detect abnormal flights from FDR data, 
and then abnormal flights are referred to domain experts for in-depth analysis to identify emerging 
risks.  
The objectives of this research are: 
1) Develop algorithms to detect abnormal flights from FDR data without pre-specification 
of parameter limits. 
The objective of the algorithms is to identify abnormal flights from FDR data without 
pre-specification of detection scope. The detection is independent of prior knowledge of 
safe operations or specification of risks. The algorithms will detect flights based on 
data patterns, rather than testing a limited set of hypotheses, possibly exposing 
unknown issues. 
2) Develop data visualizations to support expert reviewing abnormal flights. 
The flights detected by data mining method are not always operationally significant. 
They need to be referred to domain experts for an in-depth review. Data visualization 
tools are developed to help experts interpret results and quickly identify what is 
abnormal about flights detected by the algorithms. 
 
1.4 Research Overview 
In order to identify unknown issues from routine flights’ FDR data, this thesis proposed a new 
approach that uses data mining techniques to process FDR data efficiently, and it relies on 
domain experts to interpret the results and operational implications. Cluster analysis is used to 
detect flights of potential interest from FDR data, and these flights are referred to domain experts 
for in-depth analysis via data visualization tools developed in this thesis. An overview of the 
approach developed in this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.5. 
In the first step of the approach, cluster-based methods are used to detect abnormal flights 
from a large set of data. Since operations of commercial airplanes are highly standardized, a 
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majority of these flights demonstrate similar patterns in their FDR data. Assuming the majority 
are safe, flights with uncommon data patterns indicate abnormal situations, which might indicate 
increased level of risk. Therefore, flights with abnormal data patterns are labeled as potentially 
interesting flights for further inspection. Two cluster-based anomaly detection (ClusterAD) 
algorithms were developed: ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. 
The second step of the approach relies on domain experts to review the flights detected by 
anomaly detection algorithms. The algorithms are able to detect flights with abnormal data 
patterns, but these flights are not necessarily abnormal by operational standards. The system 
relies on domain experts to review flight details to draw conclusions based on their operational 
experience and knowledge. Challenges of presenting raw FDR data to domain experts are 
identified during the research. In response, this thesis developed data visualization tools to support 
the review process of domain experts. 
 
Figure 1.5 Research Overview 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Flight Data Monitoring 
Many airlines collect and analyze flight data of routine flights. The process is generally 
referred as flight data monitoring, which involves data acquisition, transmission, storage and 
analysis, which are described in detail in this section. By reviewing a number of software tools for 
flight data analysis, a benchmark of current flight data analysis methods was established. 
Improvement opportunities were identified from the literature review, which motivated this 
research. 
2.1.1 Flight Data Monitoring Process 
Major steps in the current process of flight data monitoring include data acquisition, 
transmission, and analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The equipment and technology to support 
each step is described below.  
Data acquisition and recording. Flight data are measured by hundreds to thousands of sensors 
on an aircraft during an entire flight. They are collected and converted into a single stream of 
digital format by the Flight Data Interface Management Unit (FDIMU), also named as Flight 
Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU), Flight Data and Management Systems (FDAMS), or other 
variations depending on the manufacturer and the technology used. The converted single stream 
of data is then sent to the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Quick Access Recorder (QAR) if 
equipped. The FDR, known as the black box, is a crash-survivable unit that stores flight data 
mainly for accident investigations. The QAR is similar to FDR, but have no crash survivability 
case. It is normally located in the avionics bay beneath the flight deck for easier access, and 
records data in tape, diskette, magneto-optical, or PCMCIA media for convenient data download. 
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Figure 2.1 Flight Data Monitoring Process (Sagem, 2013) 
 
Data transfer. Data stored in QAR or Digital FDR are periodically downloaded to ground 
stations by electronic transmission, wireless transmission, or manual data retrieval. The download 
period coincides with the recording memory capability of the media, or meets the operator’s need 
for timely analysis of flight data. Using wireless transmission can reduce data delivery delays, from 
several days or weeks when using manual data retrieval, to 10-15 minutes after an aircraft is 
landed (Teledyne Controls, 2011). 
Data analysis. Once the data are downloaded from QAR or Digital FDR, they are forwarded 
to the Ground Data Replay and Analysis Station (GDRAS), which transforms raw digital flight 
data into engineering values for processing and analysis. It also consists of flight data analysis, 
statistical reporting, flight animation, and other analytic tools based on the configuration, which is 
set by objective and scope of flight data monitoring programs at the operator, such as the FOQA 
or Maintenance Operational Quality Assurance (MOQA) program. Software tools for data analysis 
are discussed in detail in Section 2.1.2. After the analysis, flight data are archived for further 
analysis in the future. 
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2.1.2 Flight Data Analysis Tools 
Data analysis is the core of flight data monitoring. A number of commercial software tools are 
available to perform various types of analysis on flight data. They are often addressed as Ground 
Data Replay and Analysis Station (GDRAS) software, FOQA software, or MOQA software, most 
of which have one or more of the following functions – Analysis, Animation, and Reporting 
Analysis. All current commercial software packages analyze flight data based on a pre-defined 
library of undesired events. The techniques used include exceedance detection, statistical analysis, 
and trend analysis. Exceedance Detection identifies pre-defined undesired operational events by 
checking if particular flight parameters exceed the predefined limits under certain conditions. The 
list of flight parameters to watch and the limits of those parameters need to be specified by safety 
specialists in advance. The watch list is usually chosen to coincide with the airline’s standard 
operating procedures, such as the pitch at takeoff, the speed at takeoff climb, the time of flap 
retraction, etc. Statistical Analysis creates profiles of flight, maintenance, or engineering 
operational data. Airlines can gain a more complete picture of its operations from those profiles, 
than individual exceedance events. In Trend Analysis, airlines periodically aggregate and analyze 
exceedance events over time—for example, the number of unstabilized approaches at a particular 
airport per month, over the last 12 months. This type of analysis provides valuable information to 
the airline, especially in terms of whether the airline’s performance is improving, holding steady, or 
deteriorating. 
Animation. Exceedance events detected by software are selected and validated by specialists to 
confirm if they are unsafe operations, or if they are benign cases. Integrated 3-D flight animation 
is used to support the validation process. With libraries of cockpit panels, instruments, 3D aircraft 
models, airport runways and terrain information, flight animations can be created from the flight 
data, which help specialists to review what happened during the flight. 
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Figure 2.2 Flight Animation (Aerobytes Ltd., n.d.) 
 
Reporting. Results from exceedance detection, statistical analysis, and trend analysis, are 
reported in various formats by GDRAS software. Exceedances are normally aggregated before 
reporting, yet individual exceedances can be examined as shown in Figure 2.3. Reports of trend 
analysis include aggregated exceedance information over time (Figure 2.4). Figure 2.5 shows an 
example of statistical analysis on airspeed deviation at 500 feet across fleet type. 
 
Figure 2.3 Flight Parameters for Exceedance Detection (CAE Flightscape, n.d.-a) 
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Figure 2.4 Report: Events per 100 Flights (CAE Flightscape, n.d.-b) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Statistical Reports of Fleet Activity (Sagem, n.d.) 
 
In summary, current technology and equipment have enabled flight data monitoring, analysis, 
and anomaly detection. Flight data can be collected during flight, downloaded to ground, and 
analyzed to inform airlines about the safety and efficiency of their operations. Software tools 
currently available focus on event-based analysis, which requires events-to-watch to be defined in 
advance, with specific parameter criteria. Information on those pre-defined events can be 
evaluated through exceedance detection, statistical analysis, and trend analysis. 
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A limitation of the event-based data analysis approach is that it only detects known issues. 
One needs to specify what to look for in advance. However, accidents often happen because of 
unknown risks. The goal of this research is to develop a method to detect unknown issues without 
specifying what events to detect in advance.  
2.2 Anomaly Detection 
This thesis proposes a new approach that detects abnormal flights from routine airline 
operations using FDR data and asks domain experts to interpret the results and operational 
implications. Thus, anomaly detection algorithms will be developed to detect anomalies from FDR 
data. 
Anomaly detection refers to the problem of detecting an observation (or patterns of 
observations) that is inconsistent with the majority members of the dataset. It is also referred to 
as novelty detection, anomaly detection, fault detection, deviation detection, or exception mining 
in different application domains. A significant number of anomaly detection techniques have been 
developed. While some of the techniques are generic and can be applied to different application 
problems, many of them are focused on solving particular types of problems in an application 
domain.  
2.2.1 Anomaly Detection Categorization 
Anomaly detection varies significantly depending on the requirements and constraints of the 
application. The different characteristics of anomaly detection applications bring the need for 
developing so many diverse techniques, as how to solve the problem largely depends on how the 
problem is formulated.  
The anomaly detection problems are classified along three aspects as summarized in 
(Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009): type of input data, type of supervision, and type of 
anomalies (Table 2.1.) 
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Table 2.1 Anomaly Detection Categorization 
Problem Aspect Categories 
Input data 
Binary, categorical, continuous; 
Univariate, multivariate; 
Point data, data with structures (time series, sequences, spatial data); 
Type of 
supervision 
Supervised, semi-supervised, unsupervised 
Anomalies 
context-based outliers, instantaneous anomalies, pattern-based 
outliers, correlation-based outliers 
 
Input data are the data in which anomalies are detected. The input data can be univariate or 
multivariate depending on the number of variables. Each variable can be binary, categorical or 
continuous. Moreover, the input data can also be categorized based on whether the observations 
are independent or not. Independent observations are referred as point data (Chandola et al., 
2009). Dependent observations have temporal structure, spatial structure, or other type of 
structures among them. Examples are time series, sequences and spatial data. Different types of 
input data require different techniques to extract relevant information from raw input data.  
Depending on whether training data is needed or not, anomaly detection algorithms can be 
grouped into supervised techniques, semi-supervised techniques, and unsupervised techniques. 
Supervised anomaly detection techniques build a model based on training data sets which have 
both nominal and outlier classes. Semi-supervised techniques only need one labeled class in the 
dataset, such as nominal instances (or outlier instances). Most of the semi-supervised techniques 
construct a representative model for the nominal behavior based on the nominal instances and 
detect outliers if any test instances do not fit the model. Unsupervised anomaly detection 
techniques do not require labeled training data, but detect outliers assumes parametric 
distributions of difference classes of the data, or assumes that frequent occurrences are nominal 
while rare occurrences are outliers. 
The exact notion of an anomaly is different for different application domains. Depending on 
the specific definition of anomalies, detection techniques are different. The most basic type of 
anomaly is a data sample with values that are inconsistent with the normal3 samples in the entire 
dataset. For multivariate problems, correlation based anomalies are desired in some problems, 
                                         
3 “Normal” refers to the opposite of “abnormal”; it does not refer to having the property of a Gaussian distribution in this 
thesis. 
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since the relations among variables might be more important than individual variable values. In 
the case of input data with structures, it is often more meaningful to evaluate values in a specific 
context. A data sample is considered as an anomaly or not depending on when and where it 
occurs. Thus, the anomalies of interest might be sudden changes in time series, location specific 
deviations in spatial data, etc. Moreover, one might be interested in the patterns of 
temporal/spatial changes in the data, rather than values of individual data samples. Therefore, the 
pattern-based outliers are detected by examining trends over time/space, ordering of sequences, 
and frequency of occurrence.  
2.2.2 Anomaly Detection in This Research 
The objective of the anomaly detection in this thesis is to detect abnormal flights within 
routine flight data without prior knowledge. The problem has the following characteristics: 
The input data are multivariate time series, which are continuous, categorical or binary 
depending on the flight parameter.  
Unsupervised techniques are required by the nature of the main objective of the thesis: 
detecting abnormal flights without prior knowledge.  
The anomalies to detect are context-based and include both pattern-based anomalies and 
instantaneous anomalies. Context-based means that a data sample is considered as an anomaly or 
not depending on when it occurs. A modern aircraft is operated under many different system 
states. Whether a set of values is abnormal or not depends on which specific mode that aircraft is 
at that time. Within context-based anomalies, two types are of interest to detect: pattern-based 
anomalies which have abnormal patterns over a period of time, and instantaneous anomalies are 
instantaneous observations that are abnormal. Techniques used to detect these two types of 
anomalies are different. 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of Anomaly Detection in This Research 
Problem Aspect Characteristics  
Input data 
Multivariate time series; 
Binary, categorical or continuous 
Type of supervision Unsupervised 
Anomalies Context-based: pattern-based anomalies and instantaneous anomalies 
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No existing anomaly detection technique can be directly applied to the anomaly detection 
problem in this thesis. The following literature review of anomaly detection methods are centered 
on approaches related to the anomaly detection problem in this thesis.  
2.3 General Anomaly Detection Techniques 
Many anomaly detection techniques have been developed to address anomaly detection 
problems in many application domains. Three main approaches have been taken: statistical 
approach, classification approach, and clustering approach. The categories are not mutually 
exclusive as some of the techniques adopt concepts from more than one basic approach. (Chandola 
et al., 2009; Hodge & Austin, 2004) provide the most recent and extensive review of the anomaly 
detection techniques in various domains. Typical techniques and algorithms of each approach are 
reviewed in this part.  
2.3.1 Statistical Anomaly Detection Approaches 
The earliest approaches used for anomaly detection were based on statistical models (Hodge & 
Austin, 2004). In these approaches, a statistical distribution of data is assumed or estimated 
during training phase. Whether a data instance is an outlier or not depends on how well it fits the 
distribution.   
The most popular distribution assumed in this type of work is Gaussian model. The 
parameters of the Gaussian model are estimated in the training phase using techniques like 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates. Then statistical tests are used in the testing phase to determine if 
a given sample belongs to the distribution or not. Common outlier statistical tests include the 
Box-Plot rule (Laurikkala, Juhola, & Kentala, 2000), the Grubbs test (Anscombe & Guttman, 
1960; Grubbs, 1969; Stefansky, 1972), and variants of the Grubb test (Gibbons, Bhaumik, & 
Aryal, 2009; Rosner, 1983).  
Many techniques using a mixture of parametric models were developed for the situations in 
which a single statistical model is not sufficient to represent the data. If both normal and 
abnormal training data are available, separate parametric distributions are modeled for normal 
cases and abnormal cases using Expectation Maximization (EM) (Byers & Raftery, 1998; Eskin, 
2000). The test data are evaluated based on which distribution they belong to. If only normal 
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training data are available, a mixture of models for only normal data is developed. The test data 
are considered as outliers if they do not belong to any normal models.   
Another type of the statistical approaches uses non-parametric techniques that do not assume 
the knowledge of the data distribution. One stream of the non-parametric techniques was based on 
histogram analysis (Endler, 1998; Hofmeyr, Forrest, & Somayaji, 1998). Another stream was the 
kernel-based approaches, which approximate the density distribution using kernel functions 
(Desforges, Jacob, & Cooper, 1998). 
The statistical approach was traditionally developed for univariate data, or multivariate data 
with known distributions. Most of the techniques are not directly applicable to complex unknown 
data because this approach is effective for analysis with independent variables. However, the 
statistical approach is the basis of many other techniques, which are built on statistical concepts. 
Many techniques convert the original multivariate problem into simple data representation (e.g. 
univariate) in order to use the basic statistical approach. 
2.3.2 Classification-based Anomaly Detection Approaches 
The classification methods are used in supervised learning, which requires a training data set 
with examples of normal cases and (or) abnormal cases. In the training phase, boundaries between 
classes are created from learning the labeled data. Then in the testing phase, the trained classifier 
is used to assign a test data instance into one of the classes. Classification models used in this 
approach include neural networks, Bayesian networks, Support Vector Machines(Cortes & Vapnik, 
1995), decision trees and regression models. 
However, a dataset with both normal and abnormal class labels is not available for training in 
many anomaly detection problems. Variations and extensions of the traditional classification 
techniques are developed to perform semi-supervised learning. One-class classification (Tax & 
Duin, 1999) was developed to distinguish one class of objects from all other objects. Typically, 
data belonging to the normal class are available for training. Outliers are the data instances that 
fail to be classified into the normal class. Occasionally, only examples of abnormal cases are 
known. Anomalies are detected by testing data instance in the learnt anomaly dictionaries 
(Cabrera & Lewis, 2001).  
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The classification-based techniques are not directly suitable to address the anomaly detection 
problem in this research because the goal is to detect anomalies without prior knowledge of what 
is “normal” and what is “abnormal”. 
2.3.3 Cluster-based Anomaly Detection Approaches 
Cluster analysis refers to techniques that identify groups of data points such that data points 
in the same group are similar to each other than to those in other groups. The groups of data 
points are called as clusters in these techniques. 
Cluster-based anomaly detection techniques detect objects that do not belong to any cluster, 
or belong to very small clusters, assuming normal data are grouped in dense and large clusters. 
There are several different ways to perform the cluster analysis, such as partition-based, hierarchy-
based, proximity-based, etc. 
Partition-based clustering 
K-means is the most basic and representative technique in this category. It partitions the 
observations into k clusters to minimize the intra-cluster difference and maximize the inter-cluster 
difference. It finds the “gravity” center of each cluster, named centroid. When it is used for 
anomaly detection, the clustering is usually performed on training data that only have normal 
classes. The centroids (or medoids) are considered as normal prototypes. The most distant point in 
a cluster determines the radius of that cluster. A test instance is compared with the k prototypes. 
The outlierness is measured by comparing the distance to the centroid with the cluster radius. 
Variations of k-means include k-medoids that chooses observations as centers, and fuzzy c-means 
that allows for fuzzy partition, rather than hard partition. 
K-means has been used for novelty detection in online news and stories (Allan, Carbonell, & 
Doddington, 1998), and k-mediods has been used for fraud detection (Bolton & Hand, 2001). 
CLARANS is a popular k-medoids based algorithm, which can detect outliers as a by-product of 
the clustering process (Ng & Han, 1994). 
The biggest limitation for the partition-based clustering algorithms is that the number of 
clusters needs to be specified in advance. If the number of clusters is not assigned appropriately, 
the clustering structure obtained can be ill-defined.   
26 
 
Hierarchical clustering 
A hierarchical clustering method seeks to build a hierarchy of clusters. Two types of 
hierarchical clustering methods are often distinguished: agglomerative and divisive, depending 
upon whether a bottom-up or top-down strategy is followed. In the agglomerative method, each 
object is in its own cluster at the bottom of the hierarchy, and pairs of clusters are merged based 
on similarity as one moves up the hierarchy, until all the objects are in a single cluster or until 
certain termination conditions are satisfied. The divisive approach works in the opposite way. In 
either approach, two measures are needed to decide how to merge (or split) the clusters: a measure 
of pairwise distance between observations, and a linkage criterion that specifies the dissimilarity 
between sets. The results of clustering are usually presented in a dendrogram. A hierarchy offers 
the clustering structure at various levels, so data can be reviewed for novelty at a fine-grained or 
less specific level. The basic hierarchical clustering method was not efficient in handling large 
datasets. BIRCH (Zhang, Ramakrishnan, & Livny, 1996) and CURE (Guha, Rastogi, & Shim, 
1998) are two examples of the algorithms that employ hierarchical approach to clustering large 
datasets. 
Hierarchy clustering is usually performed as a descriptive task before anomaly detection. 
Algorithm parameters for anomaly detection are better selected after understanding the data 
distribution. Hierarchy can also be directly used to identify outliers. For example, Baker et al. 
(1999) employs the hierarchical approach in news story monitoring.  
Proximity-based clustering 
The proximity-based approaches find clusters by measuring how close a point is to its 
neighbors, assuming points in a cluster are close to each other and have similar proximity to its 
neighbors. The distance function needs to be defined to measure the proximity. DBSCAN is a 
common proximity-based clustering algorithm (Ester, Kriegel, Sander, & Xu, 1996). A cluster 
starts with k points within  distance neighborhood (the density criterion), and grows by finding 
the neighbors of the points already in the cluster which satisfy the density criterion. Outliers are 
the points that cannot form a cluster. The method does not require prior knowledge of the number 
of clusters in the data. Clusters are automatically formed until all data points have been 
processed. DBSCAN is used for one of the anomaly detection algorithms developed in this thesis. 
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Some techniques were developed with the only objective of detecting outliers. Outliers are 
identified in an optimized way, rather than as a by-product of clustering. The algorithm developed 
by (Breunig, Kriegel, Ng, & Sander, 2000) assigns an outlier score to every data point, referred as 
Local Outlier Factor (LOF), which is calculated by comparing the local density of an object to the 
local densities of its neighbors. Points that have a substantially lower density than their neighbors 
are considered outliers. LOF shares the similar concepts with DBSCAN and OPTICS in measuring 
density. LoOP (Kriegel, Kröger, & Zimek, 2009) was developed to overcome the problem of how 
to interpret the numeric outlier score in determining whether a data object indeed is an outlier. 
The LoOP technique provides an outlier score in the range of [0, 1] that is directly interpretable as 
a probability of a data object for being an outlier.  
Along the proximity-based clustering, many techniques were developed to overcome the 
limitations of DBSCAN. DENCLUE (Hinneburg & Keim, 1998) was built on a firm mathematical 
basis and has good clustering properties in handing noise. The OPTICS algorithm (Ankerst, 
Breunig, Kriegel, & Sander, 1999) provides information of the intrinsic clustering structure that 
offers additional insights into the distribution of the data. 
Besides the three clustering approaches introduced above, many other clustering techniques 
have been developed recently. The efforts were made to address problems with high 
dimensionality, large datasets, and time series. Some techniques use different measures for 
similarity, such as connectivity-based measures, angle-based measures, etc. Some techniques 
focused on reducing dimensions, such as subspace clustering and projected clustering. Since the 
research problem is a multivariate time series problem, the methods developed for time series are 
reviewed separately in Section 2.4.  
The cluster-based approaches suit the requirements of this research problem the best among 
the basic anomaly detection approaches. One advantage is that cluster-based approaches do not 
have to be supervised. Moreover, they are capable of being used in an incremental mode. After 
learning the clusters initially, new flights data can be fed and tested for outliers, and the clusters 
can be updated with the new data. 
 
Lastly, the three groups of anomaly detection approaches are not mutually exclusive. Some 
anomaly detection techniques combine different approaches together. For example, the Gaussian 
Mixture Model (GMM) is a combination of the statistical approach, classification approach and 
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clustering approach. A GMM is a parametric probability density function represented as a 
weighted sum of Gaussian component densities(Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977; McLachlan & 
Basford, 1988; Reynolds, 2008). When it is used for anomaly detection, a mixture of Gaussian 
components for normal data is developed. Each component is a multivariate Gaussian that 
represents a type of normal data. The test data are considered as anomalies if they do not belong 
to any Gaussian component. Compared to K-means, GMM is able to give statistical inferences on 
clusters. Because of its flexibility and statistical features, GMMs have been commonly used to 
model complex multivariate data for a number of applications, most notably speech 
recognition(Reynolds, 2008). It is chosen to perform cluster analysis in one of the anomaly 
detection algorithms developed in this thesis. 
2.4 Anomaly Detection Techniques for Time Series  
Anomaly detection in time series has gained great interest due to an increasing need in many 
domains. In a wide range of fields, a huge amount of data is collected at specific time intervals and 
each sample is linked to previous and upcoming values; yet, it is challenging to utilize the 
collected data effectively. Most of the techniques described in Section 2.3 are dedicated to non-
structured data and therefore are not adapted to exploit temporal relationships among 
observations. The special constraints and requirements brought by time series generate a number 
of specific anomaly detection techniques (Chandola et al., 2009). The clustering techniques for 
time series were reviewed in (Liao, 2005). A broader view on all kinds of data mining techniques 
for data streams was provided in (Gaber, Zaslavsky, & Krishnaswamy, 2005).  
Common techniques for anomaly detection on time series data are reviewed in this part. 
Despite their differences, all of the techniques have two basic components: measuring the 
dissimilarity between time series, and identifying outliers based on the dissimilarity. The former 
component is the key for time series techniques. The latter component often applies one of the 
techniques described in Section 2.3 directly or with modifications. Thus, the techniques are 
grouped into two categories based on how the dissimilarity is measured: data-based and model-
based as shown in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 Categorization of Anomaly Detection Techniques for Time Series 
 
2.4.1 Data-based Approaches 
Data-based approaches measure the dissimilarity between two time series based on data 
observations directly, without fitting the data into a model. The dissimilarity is measured by a 
distance function, which differs by technique. 
Euclidean distance. Approaches in this category measure the dissimilarity between two time 
series by aligning observations according to a temporal reference, and calculate the difference 
between every observation. They transform the sequential data into a vector of attributes and 
then calculate the Euclidean distance between vectors. The attribute value is determined by the 
value at each time. Then the problem of time series becomes a problem of static data with high 
dimensions. For example, a time series with a length of 50 samples can be converted to a vector of 
50 dimensions. The temporal information is kept by increasing the number of dimensions. The 
similarity can be measured in the vector space using the standard Euclidean distance, the root 
mean square distance, Mikowski distance, or any other variations. This approach has been 
adopted in a wide range of time series analysis, such as identifying cyclone regimes in weather 
data (Blender, Fraedrich, & Lunkeit, 1997), monitoring the flight patterns in flight tracks data 
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(Gariel, Srivastava, & Feron, 2010), etc. Box Modeling was introduced as a transformation 
technique to incorporate un-equal length sequences (Chan & Mahoney, 2005). In general, 
Euclidean distance is very sensitive to any shift in the data. If two samples are not perfectly 
aligned, the distance can be huge. Also if the event involves several phases that can shrink or 
expand, Euclidean distance does not perform well, e.g. it is useless in voice recognition. 
Dynamic time warping distance. Dynamic time warping (DTW) aligns two time series so that 
their difference is minimized. The DTW distance measures the dissimilarity between two series 
after an optimal alignment under certain constraints. Many algorithms use DTW as data pre-
possessing step before clustering or anomaly detection (Keogh, Lonardi, & Ratanamahatana, 
2004). High-level patterns in the time series can be better compared by minimizing small shifts in 
time.  
Probability-based distance. Some techniques extract probability information of each time 
sample from time series, rather than using raw data. Kumar & Woo (2002) assume each time 
series is made of samples drawn from Gaussian models, and then calculate the Chi-square 
statistics for every pair of time series as the similarity measure for hierarchical clustering. The 
distance function is scale-invariant so that clustering results are independent of the units of 
measuring data.  
Correlation-based distance. The correlations between time series are used to measure 
dissimilarity in this approach. Various measures of correlation can be used. Golay et al. (1998) 
include the Peason’s correlation factor in a distance function. Möller-Levet, Klawonn, Cho, & 
Wolkenhauer (2003) proposed Short Time Series distance (STS) that measures the differences of 
slopes in two time series.  
2.4.2 Model-based Approaches 
Model-based approaches utilize the temporal structure in the time series. Time series models 
or sequence models are built based on the raw data. Then time series are compared based on the 
parameters of the models, or the residuals obtained from the models.  
Regression model. Regression-based models are one of the earliest and widely used methods in 
modeling time series. Residuals or errors between the model prediction and the actual observation 
are used as the indicator of outlierness. Rousseeuw & Leroy (1987) gave a comprehensive 
description on the use of robust regression to build models and detect outliers. Fox (1972) modeled 
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time series as an auto-regressive process (AR). Autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models 
were used in (Abraham & Box, 1979; Abraham, 1989). The autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) model, a generalization of ARMA, was used in (Bianco, et al., 2001).  
Markovian model. The markovian models are the most popular approach to model sequential 
behaviors in the time series that are not properly aligned in time. Time series are modeled using a 
Markov chain, Hidden Markov Model (HMM), or Finite State Machine (FSM). The outlierness of 
a sequence is determined by the likelihood of that sequence computed by a learnt model, or the 
difference between a prediction and an actual event. A great number of anomaly detection 
techniques has been developed using Markovian models, eg. Markov chain-based approaches 
(Ihler, Hutchins, & Smyth, 2006; Smyth, 1994). HMM-based techniques include (Boussemart, Las 
Fargeas, Cummings, & Roy, 2009; Ilgun, Kemmerer, & Porras, 1995; Sekar et al., 2002; 
Warrender, Forrest, & Pearlmutter, 1999). Most of data used in HMM approaches are symbolic 
sequences, so time series consisting of continuous values are converted to symbolic sequences 
before building Markovian models (Srivastava, 2005). 
Compression model. Another branch of techniques extracts features from the time series using 
some compression methods, such as wavelet transformation, Fourier transformation, and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). The dissimilarity between time series is calculated based on 
extracted features. For example, (B. Amidan & Ferryman, 2000) summarized a time series by four 
coefficients (intercept, slope, quadratic, and error) using a quadratic equation model. (Vlachos, 
Lin, Keogh, & Gunopulos, 2003) presented an approach to cluster time series at various 
resolutions using the Haar wavelet transform. 
2.5 Anomaly Detection in Aviation 
Anomaly detection in aviation systems has been focused on detecting defects on mechanical 
components in the past. Recently, more studies have been conducted to model and monitor 
complex systems. (B. Amidan & Ferryman, 2000; B. G. Amidan & Ferryman, 2005) were earliest 
efforts made to identify atypical flights using onboard recorded flight data. A software package 
called the “morning report” tool was developed. In their approach, each time series was 
summarized by four coefficients using quadratic equation model and then an “atypical score” for 
each flight was computed using the Mahalanobis distance. This approach was noteworthy but 
limited. First, it is a limited representation of a time series using only four coefficients. Important 
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features in the signal may not be captured by just four parameters. Second, using Mahalanobis 
distance as the only measure to detect outliers is not the best approach, as the distribution of 
flights in the feature space is complex and cannot be measured only by the distance to origin. 
Maille & Statler (2009) compared the “morning report” tool with the traditional FOQA analysis 
software on a set of digital flight recorded data. The study showed some potential value of using 
the “morning report” tool in finding newly emergent patterns. However, the performance and 
effectiveness of the “morning report” was not explicitly evaluated.  
Some studies focused on detecting anomalies in discrete data. (S. Budalakoti, Srivastava, & 
Akella, 2006; Suratna Budalakoti, Srivastava, & Otey, 2008) developed an algorithm called 
sequenceMiner to discover anomalies in discrete parameter sequences recorded from flight data 
based on the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) measure. Both clustering analysis and 
Bayesian model were used in this algorithm. (Srivastava, 2005) proposed a statistical framework 
that can work with both continuous data and discrete data based on HMMs. In the framework, 
the continuous data were pre-processed to symbolic data with a few representative states using 
clustering analysis, and then they were treated equally as the discrete data.  
In another group of studies, normal behavior data were available and hence supervised or 
semi-supervised learning was the primary approach. (Iverson, 2004) developed the Inductive 
Monitoring System (IMS) software for real time monitoring of complex system. IMS used nominal 
data sets to extract general classes for typical system behaviors. During testing, real time 
operational data were compared with these classes to find any abnormal behaviors. Two 
application examples were presented, one for monitoring temperature sensors in the wings of a 
Space Shuttle Orbiter, and one for analyzing archived telemetry data collected from the ill-fated 
STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle mission. (Schwabacher & Oza, 2007) compared four anomaly 
detection algorithms using data from two rocket propulsion testbeds. The four algorithms were 
Orca (Bay & Schwabacher, 2003), GritBot (RuleQuest Research software package), IMS (Iverson, 
2004) and SVM (Tax & Duin, 1999). Except for Orca, training data were required for all four 
algorithms. They were designed for general complex systems, rather than explicitly for aerospace 
systems. Thus, temporal structures cannot be directly captured. (Das, Matthews, Srivastava, & 
Oza, 2010) introduced an approach based on kernel learning to incorporate the temporal structure. 
The method was a semi-supervised approach as it used one-class SVM for anomaly detection. 
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Some other studies on applying data mining techniques in aviation were generated due to the 
recent fast development in data mining techniques. (Larder & Summerhayes, 2004; Treder & 
Craine, 2005) were two examples that demonstrate the use of data mining techniques on various 
data collected at airlines, such as recorded flight data, safety reports, maintenance logs, etc. These 
two studies showed potential values of using data mining techniques in analyzing large amounts of 
data to find causalities, such as finding associations between incidents and flight information. 
However, anomaly detection problems in this research were not addressed in these studies. 
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Chapter 3  
Cluster-based Anomaly Detection 
Algorithms 
3.1 Challenges in Detecting Anomalies in FDR Data 
This thesis develops a new approach to identify unknown issues from FDR data of routine 
airline flights. The new approach detects flights of interest without specifying what to look for in 
advance, and then relies on domain experts to review detected flights for operational implications. 
It is a step forward compared with existing methods, which rely on fixed flight parameters watch-
list and predefined thresholds. Two challenges are identified in developing anomaly detection 
algorithms in this thesis: 
The first challenge is detecting flights of interest from FDR data without specifying what to 
look for. No simple formulas can explain multivariate relationships among parameters as well as 
their temporal patterns. In general, flight parameters recorded in raw FDR data vary widely over 
time. An individual flight parameter is often associated with others depending on flight dynamics, 
specific procedures, and various environmental conditions. When one flight parameter changes, it 
will affect a number of others accordingly.  
The second is the absence of prior knowledge on standard data patterns. Most existing 
anomaly detection methods assume one standard pattern, thus considering deviations from the 
standard as anomalies. However, multiple standard patterns exist in real-world operational data. 
Different phases of flight and variations in operational procedures, such as airport-specific 
procedures, air traffic control requirements, and company policies, may result in different data 
patterns. The assumption of one standard pattern is therefore not valid. The anomaly detection 
method in this thesis should be able to handle multiple standard patterns in the FDR data. 
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3.2 Concept of Cluster-based Anomaly Detection 
Algorithms 
This section presents the concept of cluster-based anomaly detection algorithms and 
terminologies used in describing the algorithms: cluster, outlier, anomalies, and abnormal flights. 
Two anomaly detection algorithms were developed to detect abnormal flights using the 
cluster-based concept. Cluster analysis is used to identify common patterns in FDR data. Multiple 
patterns exist in real-world operational data, however, the number of common patterns is finite 
because operations of commercial airline flights are highly standardized and a majority of flights 
share a few most common data patterns.  
To facilitate cluster analysis, a prior step is to transform raw FDR data into high dimensional 
vectors, on which cluster analysis can be performed. The transformation can be performed in two 
ways: 1) convert the data of each flight for a specific phase into a vector 2) convert each data 
sample of the original FDR data into a vector. Both techniques were explored and developed into 
two detection algorithms: ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. Details of each method 
will be presented in later sections in this chapter. 
After data transformation, cluster analysis is performed on vectors in the high dimensional 
space. Groups of proximate vectors are identified as clusters, which represent common data 
patterns in the dataset; vectors that do not belong to any clusters are detected as outliers, which 
indicate uncommon data patterns. 
In the last step, anomaly detection is performed based on cluster analysis result. In 
ClusterAD-Flight, outliers identified in cluster analysis are the anomalies to detect. In ClusterAD-
Data Sample, both outliers and vectors that do not belong to appropriate clusters are the 
anomalies that we want to detect. Finally, the anomalies are summarized by flight. Abnormal 
flights are flights that have relatively more or severer anomalies. 
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Figure 3.1 Concept of Cluster-based Anomaly Detection 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Framework of Cluster-based Anomaly Detection 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Two Different Ways of Data Transformation 
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3.3 Pattern-based Anomalies and Instantaneous 
Anomalies 
Anomalies in FDR data can be categorized in two types: pattern-based anomalies and 
instantaneous anomalies. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 shows examples of these two types of 
anomalies. In these two plots, anomaly signal is depicted in red. A normal profile is presented by 
blue areas – the center blue line shows the median of normal values, the dark blue area gives the 
range of 50% of normal values, and the light blue area depicts the range of 90% of normal values.  
Pattern-based anomalies are data with abnormal patterns over a specific flight phase. As 
shown in Figure 3.4, pattern-based anomalies are observed in engine parameter “N1”, which 
measures fan speed and is representative of engine thrust. The profile of “N1” is different from the 
normal profile from 6nm before touchdown to 1nm before touchdown; each individual data sample 
is not significantly deviating from the normal value. In comparison, instantaneous anomalies are 
abnormal data that occurs instantaneously. Figure 3.5 gives an example of an instantaneous 
anomaly in “Angle of Attack”.  
The objective of anomaly detection in this thesis is to detect both types of anomalies. Because 
distinct data transformation techniques are used in ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data 
Sample, we expect the two methods to be sensitive to different types of anomalies. Thus, an 
evaluation on which types of anomalies are better detected by which method was performed in 
this research. 
 
Figure 3.4 Pattern-based Anomaly Example 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Instantaneous Anomaly Example 
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3.4 ClusterAD-Flight 
ClusterAD-Flight converts data of an entire flight phase into a single point in a high-
dimensional space, where data patterns are represented by vectors. It then uses cluster analysis to 
identify clusters and outliers in the high-dimensional space. Anomalies are detected from such 
outliers. ClusterAD-Flight consists of three key steps, as illustrated in Figure 3.6:  
1. Data transformation: transforming time series into high-dimensional vectors 
2. Dimension reduction: addressing problems of multicollinearity and high dimensionality  
3. Cluster analysis: identifying clusters and outliers in high-dimensional space 
The first step transforms multivariate time series data into high dimensional vectors. The 
transformation technique anchors time series by a specific event, such as touchdown, which 
reserves the temporal information and makes it comparable among different flights. Then, in the 
second step, techniques are developed to address problems of multicollinearity and high 
dimensionality. The dimensionality of vectors is reduced for computational viability while 
maintaining essential information. In the last step, cluster analysis is performed to detect outliers 
and clusters of normal flights in the feature space of reduced dimensions. Each step is described in 
detail in the following paragraphs.  
ClusterAD-Flight is limited to flight phases that start or end with a specific event: takeoff or 
final approach. These two phases are critical phases in terms of safety because 53% of fatal 
accidents and 47% of onboard fatalities happened during those two phases for worldwide 
commercial jet fleet from 2002 to 2011 (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2012). 
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Figure 3.6. Cluster-based Detection Algorithm: ClusterAD-Flight 
 
3.4.1 Data Transformation 
In order to map raw data into comparable vectors in the high dimensional space, time series 
data from different flights are anchored by a specific event to make temporal patterns comparable. 
Then, every flight parameter is sampled at fixed intervals by time, distance or other reference 
from the reference event. All sampled values are arranged to form a vector for each flight: 
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where jt
ix  is the value of the ith flight parameter at sample time tj; m is the number of flight 
parameters; n is the number of samples for every flight parameter. The total dimensionality of 
every vector is m*n. Each dimension represents the value of a flight parameter at a particular 
time. The similarity between flights can be measured by the Euclidian distance between the 
vectors. 
Raw FDR data are anchored from a specific event and sampled at fixed intervals by time, 
distance, or other reference. For the takeoff phase, the time of takeoff power application is used as 
the reference time and a number of samples are obtained at fixed time intervals, as shown in 
Figure 3.7. For the approach phase, the time series are first transformed into a “distance-series” 
and then a number of samples are obtained backtracking from the touchdown point (Figure 3.8). 
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Distance is used as the reference rather than time in the approach phase as procedures during 
approach are often specified based on distance or height above ground.  
 
 
Figure 3.7. Sampling Time Series in Takeoff Phase 
 
Figure 3.8. Sampling Time Series in Approach Phase 
 
3.4.2 Dimension Reduction 
Because of the temporal aspect, the vectors formed in the first step will normally have 
thousands of dimensions. For example if 100 parameters are evaluated over 100 time steps, this 
will result in an 10,000 dimension analysis space. In comparison, the number of daily flights at a 
large airline is on the order of 1000 flights. This implies the typical daily dataset will have more 
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dimensions than data points. It is difficult to identify data clouds in such sparse distribution. 
Therefore, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to reduce the number of dimensions 
before performing cluster analysis. PCA is a common procedure to transform data into an 
orthogonal coordinate system based on the variance in the data (Hotelling, 1933). The coordinates 
in the new system are referred as components. The largest variance by any projection of the data 
comes to lie on the first component, the second largest variance on the 2nd, and so on. As a 
consequence, a number of last components could be dropped to reduce the hyperspace dimension 
without losing significant information. In this study, the first K components that capture 90% of 
the variance in the data are kept.  
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where i is the variance explained by principal component i. N is the total number of principal 
components, which equals to the original number of dimensions. K is the number of principal 
components kept. The magnitude of dimensional reduction will vary with the dataset but can be 
significant. As an example, in the initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight discussed later in this chapter 
(Section 3.5), the dimensions were typically reduced from 6188 to 77 for the takeoff data and from 
6279 to 95 for the landing data using this criterion. 
The use of PCA is unnecessary for large datasets that are dense enough to apply cluster 
analysis. However, anomaly detection could be biased by correlations among parameters in the 
absence of PCA. For example, if a majority of parameters in a FDR dataset are engine related, 
anomalies would be dominated be engine problems in the absence of PCA. Correlations between 
parameters are common in FDR datasets. As an example, linear correlations among parameters in 
the dataset used in the initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight are shown in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 Correlation Matrix of Original Flight Parameters (Dataset: 365 B777 flights) 
  
The thesis proposes a solution to weaken the effect of correlated parameters by first 
identifying sets of correlated parameters and then combining each set of correlated parameters 
into two measures: the average and the maximum differences of all parameters in the set. The 
former captures the general trend, while the later examines abnormal patterns. Pearson correlation 
coefficients were used to identify sets of correlated parameters. It is widely used as a measure of 
the strength of linear dependence between two variables. It was developed by Karl Pearson from a 
related idea introduced by Francis Galton in the 1880s (Pearson, 1896; Rodgers & Nicewander, 
1988; Stigler, 1989). After correlated parameters are identified, they are modified into new 
variables by set, which have much weaker linear dependence between each other. Figure 3.10 
shows the linear correlations among modified parameters after de-correlation was performed. 
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Figure 3.10 Correlation Matrix of Modified Parameters after De-correlation (Dataset: 365 B777 
flights) 
 
3.4.3 Cluster Analysis 
The clustering analysis aims to identify clusters of data in the feature space. Then, outliers can 
be detected based on the identified clusters in the feature space. The Density-Based Spatial 
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) algorithm (Ester et al., 1996) was chosen to 
perform the cluster analysis because: 1) it can automatically determine the number of clusters; 2) 
it can handle data with noise/outliers; 3) it can detect outliers while identifying clusters. 
DBSCAN is a density-based clustering algorithm. It progressively finds clusters based on a 
density criterion. A cluster forms if at least MinPts points are within  radius of a circle. The 
cluster grows by finding the neighbors of the cluster, which also satisfy the same density criterion 
until no other point can be added into the existing cluster. At this point, it starts to search for a 
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new cluster. Outliers are the points that do not belong to any cluster. Other than the two 
parameters MinPts and  to set the density criterion, no other parameters are required in 
DBSCAN. 
 
Figure 3.11. Example of DBSCAN Clustering Process 
 
The selection of the two parameters is based on sensitivity analysis. For a fixed value of 
MinPts, DBSCAN is performed multiple times using a series of  values ranging from the 
minimum pairwise distance to the maximum pairwise distance in the data. MinPts is chosen to be 
the minimum number of similar flights that can be considered as a separate nominal group. While 
the number of outliers is sensitive to the value of , the value of  was set to match user’s 
preferences: finding the top x% outliers.  
After the cluster analysis, outliers and clusters are identified in the space of reduced 
dimensions. Outliers represent the abnormal flights to be detected; clusters capture different types 
of normal flights in a dataset. 
3.5 Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Flight 
An initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight was performed using a representative DFDR dataset 
obtained from an international airline. The dataset consisted of 2881 flights including 7 aircraft 
types with 13 model variants, e.g. B777, A319, and A320. To obtain relatively homogeneous data, 
the dataset was filtered by model variant. Among the 13 model variants, the set of B777 was the 
Outlier
 = 1 
MinPts = 5
Cluster 2
Cluster 1 
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largest, which had 365 flights occurring over one month with various origins and destinations. 
This section presents results of testing the method on this dataset.  
Outlier detection was conducted separately for the approach phase and the takeoff phase. 
Three sets of DBSCAN parameters were tested to identify the top 1%, 3% and 5% outliers 
identified by the method. All the identified abnormal flights were further analyzed to determine 
the flights were abnormal and if so to characterize the abnormal behaviors. In addition, when 
more than one cluster was present the differences in the nominal cluster data patterns were 
investigated to understand the cause of the different nominal behaviors. 
3.5.1 Dataset and Data Preparation 
The FDR dataset used for the initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight contained 365 B777 flights 
with various origins and destinations from an airline. Every flight included 69 flight parameters 
including engine parameters, aircraft position, speeds, accelerations, attitudes, control surface 
positions, winds, and environmental pressures and temperatures. Radio height was only available 
during approach phase.  
To allow flights at different airports to be compared, the position related flight parameters 
were first converted to values relative to the airport. For instance, the original recorded altitude 
values (e.g. pressure altitude, density altitude) were transformed to relative altitudes (e.g. height 
above takeoff, height above touchdown).  
For the transformation from time-series to vectors, observations were obtained at 1-sec 
intervals from takeoff power up to 90 seconds after takeoff for the takeoff phase. For the approach 
phase the same number of observations was obtained from 6 nm before touchdown to touchdown. 
After performing the PCA, the number of dimensions was reduced from 6188 (68 flight parameters 
* 91 samples) to 77 for the takeoff phase and from 6279 (69 flight parameters * 91 samples) to 95 
for the approach phase.  
The sensitivity to cluster selection criteria ( and MinPts) is shown for the Approach and 
Takeoff data in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13. It was observed that the selection was insensitive to 
MinPts (between 3 and 15) but that fewer flights are identified as outliers when  increases. 
Therefore MinPts was set at a value of 5 and the value of  was selected to find the top 1%, 3% 
and 5% outliers. 
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Figure 3.12. Sensitivity to  and MinPts (Approach) 
 
Figure 3.13. Sensitivity to  and MinPts (Takeoff) 
 
3.5.2 Results Overview 
Three sets of abnormal flights were identified using different parameter settings to match the 
top 1%, 3% and 5% outlier criterion. The results are summarized in Table 3.1. Further 
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examination confirmed that abnormal flights found using a smaller outlier criterion were always 
included in the results obtained using a larger outlier criterion, as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1. Number of Abnormal Flights Identified (Dataset: 365 B777 flights) 
Find Top x% 
Abnormal 
Flights 
DBSCAN 
Setting 
(MinPts = 
5) 
Number of 
Abnormal 
Flights 
Approach 
Phase 
1%  = 122.5 3 
3%  = 93.9 10 
5%  = 89.7 16 
Takeoff 
Phase 
1%  = 100.0 4 
3%  = 85.8 9 
5%  = 83.4 22 
 
 
Table 3.2 Abnormal Flights Identified Using Different Detection Thresholds in Takeoff Phase 
 Find top x% abnormal flights 
Flight ID 1% 3% 5% 
370715 x x x 
380219 x x x 
371045 x x x 
371046 x x x 
377862  x x 
385702  x x 
378692  x x 
386369  x x 
370723  x x 
380217   x 
383285   x 
384110   x 
385160   x 
379636   x 
369755   x 
385444   x 
370019   x 
368486   x 
368487   x 
372209   x 
373921   x 
369204   x 
 
48 
 
3.5.3 Abnormal Behaviors in Flights Detected 
All of the top 5% abnormal flights were further analyzed to determine if they exhibited 
abnormal behaviors by comparing their flight parameters with distribution of flight parameters 
from all the flights.  
Two examples are presented in details in this section to show how the abnormal behaviors 
were identified. The most distinctive flight parameters for each example are presented in graphs 
that use the same format. The abnormal flights are shown by red lines. The patterns of most 
flights are depicted by blue bands. The dark blue bands indicate the 25th to the 75th percentile of 
all flights’ data; the light blue bands encompass the 5th to the 95th percentile. Respectively, the 
dark blue region contains 50% of the data, while the light blue region covers 90%. The details on 
how theses plots are generated are presented in Section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.14. Example Abnormal Flights in Approach Phase: Approach Low and Slow 
 
Flight 383780 is a low and slow approach (Figure 3.14). The vertical profile is always below 
the common glide slop until 2 nm before touchdown and the calibrated airspeed is lower than 
most other flights until 3 nm before touchdown. Moreover, the flap is set to the landing 
configuration, 30, from at least 6 nm before touchdown. Therefore, this flight has to use a much 
higher thrust than most others until touchdown. It is also noted that a higher than normal pitch 
attitude is used to catch the glide slop between 3 nm and 2 nm before touchdown. 
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Figure 3.15. Example Abnormal Flights in Approach Phase: Unusual Flap Setting  
 
Flight 383285 uses Flap 25 all the way up from 6 nm before touchdown until landing, while 
most other flights are using Flap 30 as the landing configuration, as shown in Figure 3.15. So less 
thrust is needed for the final part of the approach than most flights. Meanwhile, major indicators 
of the approach performance, the altitude, the airspeed and the pitch, are within the 90% normal 
range. 
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Figure 3.16. Example Abnormal Flights in Takeoff Phase: Reduced Power Takeoff 
 
Example takeoff anomalies are shown in Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17. Flight 379636 shown in 
Figure 3.16 used a much lower takeoff power than most other flights although it was at a 
relatively heavy weight. The degraded takeoff performance is apparent as the aircraft accelerates 
slowly and the rotation is not made until the airspeed reaches the required level. In addition, at 80 
seconds after applying takeoff, the pitch reaches 15 degree that is similar to the angle during 
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initial rotation. As the aircraft is relatively underpowered, the climb rate is much lower than other 
flights as well. 
 
Figure 3.17. Example Abnormal Flights in Takeoff Phase: Changed Power Takeoff 
 
Flight 372209 (Figure 3.17) displays behavior similar to Flight 379636 for the first 20 seconds 
after applying takeoff power, as shown in Figure 3.16 right column. However, the power setting is 
changed back to normal level before rotation happens. As a result, the takeoff performance is 
better than Flight 379636. However, the climb rate and the acceleration are still lower than most 
other flights. 
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The same analysis was performed for all abnormal flights detected. All identified flights 
exhibited some identifiable degree of anomaly. For the approach phase, the most frequent 
abnormal behaviors were high energy approaches and low energy approaches (Table 3.3). Some 
flights were found to have unusual operations, such as abnormally high pitch, unusual flap 
settings, and lining up with localizer relatively late. In addition, environmental anomalies, such as 
strong crosswind and high atmospheric temperature, were found in some of the abnormal flights. 
 
Table 3.3. Abnormal Behaviors in Approach Phase of the Top 5% Abnormal Flights (Dataset: 
365 B777 flights) 
Flight ID: Abnormal behaviors 
High energy approaches 
371040: Fast 
373547: Fast 
377860: Fast 
378688: Fast, unstable airspeed  
377844: High, line up late 
377288: Initially fast, then normal 
379685: Initially fast, then slow 
Low energy approaches 
383780: Low, slow 
375698: Low, high power 
383270: Low, unusual yaw trim 
Other Unusual operations 
383285: Unusual flap setting 
384110: Unusual flap setting 
371044: Abnormal high pitch 
371045: Line up late 
Environmental anomalies 
372235: High atmosphere temperature 
379665: Strong crosswind 
 
The abnormal behaviors in takeoff are summarized in Table 3.4. The most frequent abnormal 
behaviors were high and low power takeoffs which often include other notable factors. Also 
observed were: excessive reduction of power after takeoff, double rotation, and high pitch attitude 
during takeoff. It should be noted that not all abnormal flights identified indicate safety concerns. 
Some flights were identified as abnormal but were benign cases, such as the takeoff in strong wind 
and the flight that turned soon after takeoff. 
 
Table 3.4. Abnormal Behaviors in Takeoff Phase of the Top 5% Abnormal Flights (Dataset: 
365 B777 flights) 
Flight ID: Abnormal behaviors 
High power takeoffs 
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377862: Early rotation, high & fast climb 
out 
380217: Early rotation, early turn 
380219: Early rotation, crosswind  
370715: Light, accelerate fast, climb fast 
383285: Light, early rotation, early turn 
384110: Light, climb out high, early turn 
385160: High climb out, high pitch rotation 
Low power takeoffs 
368486: Reduced power, low & slow climb 
out 
368487: Reduced power, low & slow climb 
out 
369755: Reduced power, low & slow climb 
out 
370019: Reduced power, low & slow climb 
out, extended period of high pitch 
371045: Reduced power, low climb out 
371046: Reduced power 
379636: Reduced power, low climb out 
385444: Reduced power, low & slow climb 
out 
Abnormal power settings 
369204: Excessive power reduction after 
takeoff 
372209: Start with reduced takeoff power 
then switch to normal takeoff power, low & 
slow climb out 
378692: Extended period of takeoff power 
Other Unusual operations 
373921: Double rotation 
385702: High pitch rotation, climb out high 
386369: Early turn after takeoff 
Environmental anomalies 
370723: Rise of spoiler, strong wind 
 
3.5.4 Nominal Data Patterns from Clusters 
The cluster analysis method can also be used to recognize different nominal patterns in the 
data which can be identified by different clusters. Each cluster represents a type of nominal data 
pattern. Typical operational behaviors can be characterized by retrieving flights from these 
clusters. 
In this dataset, a single dominant cluster was found in the approach phase; while in the 
takeoff phase, a large cluster and two small clusters were identified. The result shows that most 
takeoffs shared a common data pattern and two small groups of takeoffs involved other patterns 
in this dataset. Table 3.5 summarizes the cluster structure identified using different density 
criterion. Cluster 2 was labeled as a separate cluster by all three outlier criteria, which indicates 
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that flights in Cluster 2 were distinctive from most flights. Flights in Cluster 3 were identified to 
belong to a separate cluster only when the 3% outlier criterion is used. The flights in Cluster 3 
were merged into Cluster 1 using the 1% outlier criterion and were classified as outliers using the 
5% outlier criterion. Cluster 3 can be viewed as a sub cluster at the border of Cluster 1. 
The differences between the clusters can be seen in Figure 9. Flights belong to Cluster 2 were 
takeoffs at OR Tambo International Airport (ICAO: FAJS), near the city of Johannesburg, South 
Africa. Due to the high altitude (5558 ft MSL), the takeoff performance is degraded compared to 
most other flights, as shown in green in Figure 3.18. Flights belonging to Cluster 3 were reduced 
power or de-rated takeoffs. They are shown in orange in Figure 3.18. They show reduced power 
settings with subsequently late rotations and lower climb rates. 
 
Table 3.5. Number of Flights in Clusters by Outlier Criterion in Takeoff Phase 
 
Outlier Criterion 
1% 3% 5% 
Cluster 1 353 341 335 
Cluster 2 8 8 8 
Cluster 3 -- 7 -- 
Outliers 4 9 22 
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Figure 3.18. Patterns of Flights in Cluster 2 (Left) and Cluster 3 (Right) in Takeoff Phase 
 
In summary, ClusterAD-Flight was applied to a representative Digital FDR dataset of 365 
B777 flights. Abnormal flights were detected. The examination on these flights showed uncommon 
operations, e.g. high energy approaches, unusual pitch excursions, abnormal flap settings, high 
wind conditions, etc. In addition, multiple clusters representing nominal conditions were also 
detected. Three distinct takeoff clusters were identified in this data set: one represented a majority 
of the takeoff cases, one associated with a specific high altitude airport, one correlated with 
reduced power takeoffs. 
 
  
Cluster 1 
- Majority
Cluster 2 
- Takeoffs at FAJS 
Cluster 3
- Reduced Power takeoffs
Legend:
57 
 
3.6 ClusterAD-Data Sample 
ClusterAD-Data Sample converts instantaneous data samples of FDR data into vectors for 
cluster analysis. Clusters identified in this space represent nominal modes of aircraft operations. 
An operational mode is a relatively stable state of aircraft, and it often takes place during a 
certain flight phase and can be described by a set of flight parameters. Commercial passenger 
flights follow highly standardized procedures, and these procedures result a finite number of 
operational modes that an airplane could be in. Examples of an operational mode include level 
flight at a certain cruising speed, descent with a particular descent rate, final flare, touchdown, 
etc.  
Operational modes determine values of flight parameters. Therefore, instantaneous data 
samples can be evaluated based on operational modes identified in cluster analysis. Whether a 
data sample is nominal or not is evaluated by two factors: 1) whether it belongs to a mode, 2) 
whether the mode is an appropriate one, eg flare mode is not appropriate at the beginning of an 
approach. In order to calculate these two factors, a parameterized model of modes and mode 
distribution are required.  
Therefore, the following three steps are performed in ClusterAD-Data Sample: 
1. Identification of nominal modes 
2. Characterization of mode distribution 
3. Anomaly detection 
In the first step, nominal modes of an aircraft from FDR data are identified using cluster 
analysis. In the second step, the distribution of nominal modes is summarized by counting number 
of observations. Every nominal mode has a range that it is most likely to happen, e.g. the “final 
flare” mode is more likely to happen at the end of the approach phase. In the last step, anomalies 
are detected based on the nominal modes and their temporal distribution. Each step is described 
in detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 3.19 Cluster-base Detection Algorithm: ClusterAD-Data Sample 
 
3.6.1 Identification of Nominal Modes 
In the first step, instantaneous data samples are converted into vectors in a hyperspace, and 
then clusters of proximate vectors are identified in the hyperspace. Each cluster represents a 
frequently observed operational mode in the dataset, which is referred as a nominal mode. These 
clusters will be used to assess the abnormality of data samples.  
 
Figure 3.20 Transforming Instantaneous Data Samples to Hyperspace 
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In detail, ClusterAD-Data Sample maps original FDR data into a hyperspace sample by 
sample. Each sample of FDR data from flight f  at time t , distance t , or other reference index t , 
is represented by a vector in the hyperspace, as in the form, 
],,,[ 21 mttt
f
t xxx x , (3.1) 
where 
m
tx  is the value of the 
thm  flight parameter at reference index t . All samples during a phase 
of flight for all flights are transformed into the hyperspace. The samples of relatively stable states 
are naturally clustered together, because the values of flight parameters are determined by the 
states.  
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is then used to identify these clusters. The identified 
clusters, namely nominal modes, are defined by multivariate Gaussian distributions. A GMM is a 
parametric probability density function represented as a weighted sum of Gaussian component 
densities(Dempster et al., 1977; McLachlan & Basford, 1988; Reynolds, 2008). GMMs are 
commonly used as a parametric model of the probability distribution of continuous measurements 
or features. Compared to K-means, GMM is able to give statistical inferences on clusters.  
A GMM with K components is given by the equation, 
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where x  is a D-dimensional continuous-valued data vector, ,,,1, Kiwi   are the mixture 
weights, and ,,,1,),( Kig ii x are the component Gaussian densities. Each component 
density is a D-variate Gaussian function of the form, 
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with mean vector i and covariance matrix i . The mixture weights satisfy the constraint that
1
1


K
i
iw .  
The GMM components represent nominal modes observed in the dataset. The nominal modes 
exhibit features of typical operational states of aircraft during a phase of flight. Typical 
operational states include “ILS approach", “Flare”, “Touchdown”, “Thrust reverser deployment”, 
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etc. For example, Figure 3.21 shows a GMM component identified as the operational mode “ILS 
approach”. All parameter values are normalized in this figure. A few discrete parameters related to 
ILS approach are labeled by their operational meanings. 
 
Figure 3.21 An Example of Nominal Mode: ILS Approach 
 
A GMM configuration needs to be specified to build a GMM model, including full or diagonal 
covariance matrices, shared parameters or not among the Gaussian components and the number of 
components. These are often determined by the amount of data available for estimating the GMM 
parameters and how the GMM is used in a particular application. 
In this particular application, we choose to use diagonal covariance matrices, independent 
parameters among Gaussian components, and estimate the number of mixture components (K) by 
sensitive analysis.  
The covariance matrices are restricted to be diagonal in order to reduce computational 
complexity. Because the component Gaussians are acting together to model the overall vector 
density, full covariance matrices are not necessary even if flight parameters are not statistically 
independent. The linear combination of diagonal covariance basis Gaussians is capable of modeling 
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the correlations between vector elements. The effect of using a set of full covariance matrix 
Gaussians can be equally obtained by using a larger set of diagonal covariance Gaussians.  
The parameters of each Gaussian are not shared among components, because we assume 
operational modes are independent from others. 
The number of mixture components (K) is estimated by sensitive analysis. A series of K values 
are tested and the optimal one is chosen based on Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 
1978). BIC is a measure of the relative goodness of fit of a statistical model. It has been widely 
used for model identification in time series and linear regression(Abraham & Box, 1979). BIC 
rewards model accuracy and penalizes model complexity. With the increase of K, BIC gets lower 
because of improved goodness of fit when K is relatively small; with further increase of K, BIC 
starts to increase as the penalty of overfitting rises. The value of K is chosen that gives the 
minimum BIC.  
After a GMM configuration is selected, the parameters of a GMM (   Kiw iii ,,1,,,   ) 
are obtained using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm(Dempster et al., 1977). The 
basic idea is, beginning with an initial model (   Kiw iii ,,1,,,   ) to estimate a new model 
which has a larger likelihood given the training data. The new model then becomes the initial 
model for the next iteration and the process is repeated until some convergence threshold is 
reached. 
After a GMM is obtained, the probability of a data sample belonging to a nominal mode can 
be calculated,  
),() mode nominal from is ( qqgqp  xx  (3.4) 
 
qq , are the estimated parameters for component q . 
3.6.2 Characterization of Mode Distribution 
Training a GMM on FDR data provides a parameterized model of nominal modes. However, 
mode distribution across flight phases is not included in the model. To assess the abnormal level of 
a data sample, we also need to know which nominal modes are appropriate at a particular time, 
distance, or other reference index during a flight phase. 
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In order to know which modes are more likely to be appropriate as a function of time or 
distance, the number of observations of every nominal mode is counted across different time, 
distance, or other reference during a phase of flight. Figure 3.22 illustrates the distribution of 
nominal modes across distance to touchdown during approach phase from a test dataset. The 
number of observations of a mode is indicated by dot size and color density. This example shows 
that Mode 33 is the most appropriate mode at the time of touchdown in this dataset.  
 
 
Figure 3.22 Temporal Distribution of Nominal Modes from a Dataset 
 
Based on the mode distribution, which modes are appropriate at a particular reference (t) 
during a flight phase can be calculated. The measure is the probability of a mode at t, 
)at   mode nominal( tqp , which is computed using the following formulas. Given a GMM obtained, 
the posterior probability of a data sample belonging to a particular component q  is given by the 
equation, 
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where 
f
tx  is a data sample from flight f  at time t, distance t, or other reference t. The 
probability of a nominal mode q  being proper given all the identified nominal modes, is estimated 
by aggregating the posterior probabilities of all samples at t, as given by this formula,  
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where n  is the total number of flights in the dataset, K  is the total number of nominal modes. 
3.6.3 Detecting Anomalies Based on Nominal Modes 
In the last step, a probability of being nominal for every data sample is computed, and 
abnormal flights are detected based on individual samples. The probability of a data sample being 
nominal is determined by 1) which nominal mode it is likely to belong to, 2) whether that nominal 
mode should be observed. Mathematically, it is a sum of the probability of a sample belonging to 
a mode, weighted by the probability of the mode being proper, over all modes, as in the form, 
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 and K is the number of nominal modes identified in the dataset. Both ) mode from is ( ip ftx  
and )proper is  mode( ip are available through calculations in previous steps, as described in 
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Section 3.6.1 and Section 3.6.2. As a result, a probability profile for every flight can be 
constructed. Figure 3.23 shows a probability profile of a flight during approach. The x-axis is the 
distance to touchdown. The y-axis is the logarithm of nominal) is ( ftp x , - a higher value indicates 
the data sample being relatively normal comparing to other samples in the dataset; a lower value 
means relatively abnormal. The probability is displayed in a logarithmic scale because the original 
data covers a large range of values. 
 
Figure 3.23 Probability Profile of a Flight during Approach   
 
Anomalies are be detected by identifying any samples with )minno is ( alp ftx  that is lower 
than a threshold. A threshold value is set based on the distribution of all samples’
nominal) is ( ftp x . An example is given in Figure 3.24. It shows a distribution of probabilities for 
all data samples in a dataset with 10528 A430 flights during approach phase. Without assuming 
the distribution to be Gaussian or other common statistical distribution, a threshold value can be 
set based on a percentile value, e.g. if threshold is chosen to be the 1st percentile value, the top 1% 
anomalies will be detected. 
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Figure 3.24 Distribution of nominal) is ( ftp x for All Data Samples 
 
The evaluation of flights is based on the sum of nominal) is ( ftp x  values over all samples for 
a flight during a flight phase. The sum, which is referred as nominal score, indicates the overall 
level of a flight being nominal. Abnormal flights are identified as the flights with the lowest 
nominal scores.  
3.7 Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Data Sample 
This section presents an initial testing of ClusterAD-Data Sample on a large set of data from 
an airline. This set of FDR data contains 10528 A320 flights. The large dataset is required because 
the number of observations needs to be much larger than the number of dimensions in the data; 
clusters might be ill-defined if the density of data is low in the hyperspace.  
This section demonstrates the steps in ClusterAD-Data Sample and how algorithm parameters 
were selected given a new set of data. Examples of anomalies detected are presented in this 
section.  
3.7.1 Dataset and Data Preparation 
In order to test ClusterAD-Data Sample, a set of FDR data which contains 10528 A320 flights 
with same engine configurations was used. These flights are operations from a commercial airline 
in recent years. There are 36 airports involved as either the origin or the destination of these 
flights.  
66 
 
Each flight’s recording has 142 flight parameters (113 continuous ones and 29 discrete ones). 
To allow flights at different airports to be compared, position related flight parameters were first 
converted to values relative to the airport. For instance, original recorded altitude values (e.g. 
pressure altitude, density altitude) were transformed to relative altitudes (e.g. height above 
takeoff, height above touchdown).  
The analysis focused on the approach phase, which was defined as from 6nm before touchdown 
to touchdown.  
3.7.2 Optimal Number of Nominal Modes 
To construct a Gaussian Mixture Model in ClusterAD-Data Sample, the number of mixture 
components (K) is the only parameter need to be specified; all the others are trained from the 
data. The mixture components represent nominal modes. A sensitivity analysis of K was 
performed in order to select the optimal K. Different GMMs with a series of K were trained on the 
data. Figure 3.25 shows the changes of BIC with K increases. When K is smaller than 35, the 
model fits the data better with the increase of K; then BIC starts to increase with further growth 
of K because it penalizes the complexity of a model – a tradeoff between goodness of fit and 
overfitting. Based on a BIC curve shown in Figure 3.25, the optimal K value is 35. 
 
Figure 3.25 Sensitivity Analysis of Number of Components Based on BIC 
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3.7.3 Nominal Modes 
A GMM with K = 35 was trained on the data, which identified 35 nominal modes. Each 
nominal mode was defined by a Gaussian mixture component, which specifies mean values and 
standard deviations of all flight parameters. Based on the mean values and standard deviations, 
each Gaussian mixture component was further examined to identify features of typical operational 
modes during approach phase. A nominal mode identified as “ILS approach” is shown in Figure 
3.26. The mean values and standard deviations of flight parameters in this mode are normalized 
and displayed in this figure. The discrete parameter values indicate this mode is an ILS approach: 
CAT3 capability = true, Glideslope hold mode = on, Localizer hold mode = on, Approach type = 
ILS and Autopilot = engaged. In addition, the continuous parameters have values that are normal 
during an ILS approach, which confirms that this mode is an ILS approach. 
 
Figure 3.26 Nominal Mode Example: “ILS Approach” 
 
A nominal mode identified as “Thrust reverser deployment” is shown in Figure 3.27. In this 
mode, discrete parameters show that Air/Ground indicator = ground, Landing gear = down, 
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Thrust reverser deployed = true, Thrust reverser in transit = true, Thrust reverser stowed = 
false. Also, the vertical speed related parameters indicate that vertical speed is 0 in this mode. 
 
 
Figure 3.27 Nominal Mode Example: “Thrust Reverser Deployment” 
 
A number of typical operational modes were identified by examining original flight parameter 
values. These operational modes include “Descent with autopilot on, flap 2, gear up”, “Descent 
with autopilot on, flap 2, gear down”, “ILS approach", “Visual approach without flight director”, 
“Visual approach with flight director”, “Flare with auto-throttle on”, “Flare with auto-throttle off”, 
“Touchdown”, “Thrust reverser in transit”, “Thrust reverser deployment”, as shown in Figure 3.28. 
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Figure 3.28 Distribution of Nominal Modes during Approach Phase 
 
The distribution of these nominal modes during approach phase is shown in Figure 3.28. 
Nominal modes representing typical operational states are labeled. Many flights started the 
approach phase with Mode 2: “Descent with flap 2 and gear up” and Mode 5: “Descent with flap 2 
and gear down”. Between 4 nm and 2 nm before touchdown, the most frequently observed mode is 
Mode 17: “ILS approach.” After the “ILS approach” mode, typical modes include Mode 21: “Visual 
approach without flight director”, Mode 25: “Visual approach with flight director at lower pressure 
altitude” and Mode 27: “Visual approach with flight director at higher pressure altitude”. At the 
end of the approach phase, Mode 33: “Touchdown” has significantly more observations that other 
modes, as indicated by the large dark blue dot at Mode Index = 33 and Distance to touchdown = 
0nm.  
3.7.4 Anomaly Detection 
Whether a sample is abnormal or not is measured by the probability of a sample being 
nominal, nominal) is ( ftp x  - a higher value indicates a sample is more nominal. The probability is 
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calculated based on the trained GMM and the distribution of nominal modes, using Equation 
(3.7). 
Abnormal samples, namely instantaneous anomalies, were detected by a detection threshold 
set based on the distribution of nominal) is ( ftp x  across all data samples in this dataset as shown 
in Figure 3.29. The distribution has a long left tail, which indicates that detecting low-value 
outliers is relatively insensitive to the value of detection threshold (Figure 3.30).  
 
Figure 3.29 Distribution of nominal) is ( ftp x  for All Data Samples 
 
Figure 3.30 Sensitivity Analysis of Detection Threshold for Instantaneous Anomalies 
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Abnormal flights were detected based on an evaluation on a flight level, calculated by the sum 
of nominal) is ( ftp x  over all data samples in a flight during a focused flight phase. The distribution 
of normal) is Flight ( fp was heavily left-skewed as shown in Figure 3.31. In order to detection the 
top 0.5%, 1%, and 3% abnormal flights, the detection threshold could be set as -35000, -5000, and 
3000 accordingly.  
 
Figure 3.31 Distribution of Flight Nominal Score 
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Figure 3.32 Sensitivity Analysis of Detection Threshold for Abnormal Flights 
 
A list of abnormal flights was detected. An evaluation with domain experts was performed to 
evaluate the operational significance of flights detected. Details will be presented in Chapter 5. 
This section gives an example of an abnormal flight detected at detection threshold = 1%. The 
probabilities of data samples of this flight are shown by a red line in FX. The blue region 
represents the most centered 90% values of all data samples. The flight was abnormal for a short 
period of time between 3nm before touchdown and 2nm before touchdown. An inspection of the 
original flight parameters found that parameters related to left engine had abnormal values during 
that period.  
 
Figure 3.33 Probability Profile of an Abnormal Flight 
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Figure 3.34 Engine Parameters of the Abnormal Flight 
 
3.8 Summary 
Two anomaly detection algorithms were developed to identify abnormal flights without 
specifying parameter limits. There are two different techniques to convert raw FDR data into a 
form applicable for cluster analysis. Both techniques were explored. ClusterAD-Flight converts 
data of a flight for a specific phase into a hyperspace for cluster analysis. ClusterAD-Data Sample 
converts data samples into a hyperspace for cluster analysis. This chapter presented the 
methodologies of two algorithms and demonstrated both algorithms on testing datasets. 
74 
 
Chapter 4  
Expert Review and Data 
Representation 
This chapter presents a review process of examining abnormal flights detected by anomaly 
detection algorithms and discusses practical challenges in implementing the review process. In 
order to address the practical challenges, data visualization tools are developed and tested to 
facilitate expert review. An experiment with domain experts was conducted to test data 
visualization tools developed in the thesis. The results showed that the data visualization tools 
were effective in presenting the information of abnormal flights and locating abnormality across 
flight parameters and time.  
4.1 Expert Review Process and Practical Challenges 
Domain experts’ review is essential to obtain operationally meaningful results from the 
abnormal flights detected. ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample provide a way to 
identify abnormal flights with atypical data patterns. However, these flights need to be reviewed 
by domain experts, in order to determine their operational significance, whether they are 
operationally abnormal or not and whether they are indicating emerging risks or not. 
The flow of anomaly detection and expert review process is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Reviewing 
abnormal flights requires many sources of information available to domain experts, such as data of 
the flight to be reviewed, normal data patterns, operation standards, weather information, airport 
information, and local procedures. Domain experts then rate the level of operational significance 
and identify signs of safety hazards, if any, based on the information presented and their 
operational experience and knowledge.  
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Figure 4.1 Flowchart of Anomaly Detection and Expert Review 
 
Since the review process is performed by flight safety analysts, practical factors need to be 
considered in the design of the expert review process. It matters how the review process is 
performed, how the information is presented, and how the results are organized, as it is a 
subjective evaluation task. Practical challenges are found during initial tests of expert review 
process. 
The workload constraints are the most critical among the practical challenges. The review 
process is labor intensive, examining tens to hundreds flight parameters for each flight. Figure 4.2 
is a mosaic of some flight parameters of a flight, which gives a sense of how large the information 
is for each flight to be reviewed by a safety analyst. At an early stage of this study, at least 30 
minutes were needed on average for a domain expert to review a flight. Each flight had 51 flight 
parameter plots as shown in Figure 4.2. Without data representation tools to support the review 
process, it is extremely time consuming to go through each flight parameter and to look for what 
is abnormal about the flight and indications of safety hazards. 
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Figure 4.2 Part of Flight Parameters to Review for a Flight  
 
Given the practical challenges, data visualization tools were developed to support the review 
process with the purpose of maximizing the chance of identifying operational issues and keeping 
the workload minimal. These visualization tools were designed to present relevant information 
effectively, make the abnormality directly identifiable, and reduce the time needed to review a 
flight. Section 4.2 describes the data visualization tools.  
4.2 Data Visualization Tools for Expert Review 
Flights detected by anomaly detection algorithms are referred to domain experts to look for 
operational significance. A large amount of information about these flights are provided to domain 
experts, in order to understand what happened during the flight, whether it was operationally 
abnormal or not, and if it was abnormal, whether the abnormality indicated any kind of emerging 
risks. Two types of data visualization tools were developed to support the review process. Flight 
parameter plots were developed to present FDR data of individual flight parameters. Flight 
abnormality visualization was developed to help analysts quickly identify sources of anomalies 
across flight parameters and time in a flight phase. 
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4.2.1 Flight Parameter Plot 
An essential part of the review process is to present raw FDR data in graphics. Plots that 
show raw FDR data of a flight have been used for a long time. The format becomes standardized 
across software tools: lines to depict time-series of flight parameters over time, as shown in Figure 
4.3. However, these plots only show the information of the flight to be reviewed. No reference 
information is available in the plots, such as normal data patterns, operational standards, weather 
information, airport information, and local procedures. To determine whether the flight is 
abnormal or not, analysts need to either use their own knowledge or look up the reference 
information from other sources. Some efforts have been made to incorporate reference information 
in time-series plots, for example, a tool developed by Amidan and Ferryman in 2005 gives a 
performance envelope in the background (Figure 4.4), which is a contour plot that consists of 
superimposed gray to black boxes displaying the number of flights that shared that value at that 
time(B. G. Amidan & Ferryman, 2005).  
 
  
Figure 4.3 Examples of Traditional FDR Time-series Plots 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Performance Envelope Plot of Flap Position with Three Flight Traces (B. G. 
Amidan & Ferryman, 2005) 
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A new design of flight parameter plot is developed in this thesis. Each plot shows the 
information of a flight parameter with two elements: 1) information of the flight to review; 2) 
reference information of normal flights. The information of the flight to review is shown in a 
standard format: a time-series plot of the flight parameter over a period of time and is highlighted 
in red. The reference information of normal flights is overlaid on the same plot of the flight to 
review. It shows the normal range of the flight parameter over time, and it is always color-coded 
in blue. Making the reference information directly available supports domain experts to visually 
spot abnormalities. Using the same concept, the detailed design slightly differs for continuous 
flight parameters and discrete parameters to best present information based on data type. 
Flight Parameter Plot for Continuous Parameters  
An example of the plot for continuous flight parameters is shown in Figure 4.5. In this plot, 
the airspeed value of the flight to review is indicated in red. The reference information of normal 
flights is given by the blue bands. In the lighter blue band, the lower limit is the 5th percentile 
value of all flights, for that flight parameter at that time; the upper limit is the 95th percentile 
value. The darker blue band is plotted in a similar way – the lower limit is the 25th percentile 
value, and the upper limit is the 75th percentile value. Therefore, the lighter blue band indicates 
the center distribution of 90% of the data, and the darker blue band depicts the most centered 
50% of the data. The blue bands show the changes in value and variation of a flight parameter 
over time. By reading the red line reference to blue bands makes the comparison between the 
flight to review and normal flights straightforward. For example, the airspeed is higher than most 
flights from 6nm to 3 nm before touchdown in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5 Example of Flight Parameter Plot for Continuous Parameters 
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In this design, the reference information is given by percentiles of all flights, instead of 
standard deviations. The reason is that percentiles are more robust than standard deviations when 
applied to real-world data. It is a non-parametric measure, thus, does not require the data fit a 
normal distribution. In addition, it is not sensitive to outliers with extreme values. 
Computational Techniques to Generate Flight Parameter Plots 
Plotting flight parameter plots requires that percentile statistics are generated based on raw 
FDR data. Traditional computing techniques require all data to be loaded into memory before 
calculating the statistics. The memory capacity limits the size of data sets that can be processed. 
Thus, when massive amounts of data need to be processed, one-pass algorithms are preferred, 
because they scan through observations without storing all of them in the memory. Only necessary 
statistics are recorded, so the storage requirements are low and fixed regardless of the number of 
observations. Methods to construct one-pass algorithm are straightforward for parametric 
statistics, e.g. mean and standard deviation. However, for non-parametric statistics, e.g. median 
and percentiles, one-pass algorithms use heuristics and other techniques to approximate those 
statistical measures. 
In this study, a one-pass algorithm: P2 algorithm for dynamic calculation of quantiles and 
histograms without storing observations (Jain & Chilamtac, 1985) is applied to estimate 
percentiles of a data set. Instead of storing a complete distribution, it stores only five markers and 
updates the markers as more observations come in. The five markers are the minimum, the 
maximum, and the current estimates of (p/2)-, p-, and (1+p)/2-quantiles, to get the p-quantile of 
n observations, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6 The Five Markers in P2 Algorithm to Estimate a p-quantile 
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Flight Parameter Plot for Discrete Parameters  
In the plots of discrete flight parameter, the format is changed to best suit features of discrete 
variables. If the same plotting format for continuous parameters is used for discrete parameters, 
the blue bands are not informative, as shown in Figure 4.7, which shows when the autopilot is 
disconnected. Because the value of a binary flight parameter is either 0 or 1, no matter what 
percentile to choose, the blue bands either cover across 0 to 1, or shrink to a line on 0 or 1. It 
cannot effectively present information of when and how many flights switch from one level to 
another of the discrete parameter. Therefore, the discrete parameters are plotted in a way as 
shown in Figure 4.8. The red line indicates the parameter value of the flight to review, same as 
before. However, the reference information is presented differently. Since only a finite number of 
values exist for discrete parameters, all possible values of the discrete parameter are depicted. Blue 
areas give the distribution of all flights at different values of the discrete parameter – the height of 
blue area on a value level indicates the percentage of flights whose parameter value equals to that 
level at that time. 
 
Figure 4.7 Discrete Flight Parameter Plotted in the Format of Continuous Parameter Plot 
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Figure 4.8 Example of Flight Parameter Plot for Discrete Parameters 
 
Organization of Flight Parameter Plots 
Depending on data sets, the total number of flight parameter plots varies from tens to 
hundreds. It is necessary to organize these parameter plots in an effective way to help analysts to 
browse through and locate plots of interest. In this visualization tool, users have the option to 
configure their preferred layout. As an example, Figure 4.9 is a prototype configuration after 
consulting with domain experts. The plots are arranged into 10 groups: 1) Basic flights 
parameters, including altitude, airspeed, aircraft attitudes, accelerations, thrust, and flap settings. 
2) Flight parameters related to weather. 3) Flight parameters related to flight dynamics. 4) Flight 
parameters related to engine. 5) Flight parameters related to fuel, weight and balance. 6) Flight 
parameters related to control surfaces. 7) Flight parameters related to autopilot modes. 8) Flight 
parameters related to brakes and gear. 9) Flight parameters related to pneumatic. 10) Other flight 
parameters in the data set.  
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Figure 4.9 A Configuration to Organize Flight Parameter Plots 
 
 
4.2.2 Flight Abnormality Visualization 
Why is it needed? 
The Flight Parameter Plots provide a way to inspect individual flight parameters; however, it 
is very time-consuming to go through pages of plots to locate what is abnormal about a flight. 
One option to reduce the time is to present only a few parameters. But which parameters shall be 
presented? The chance of identifying issues of interest is limited to the presented parameters. The 
conventional approach of pre-defining a list of important parameters by domain experts is limited, 
as abnormal behaviors might be hidden in other “not-so-important” flight parameters for different 
cases. 
A new visualization tool is proposed to address this issue, reducing the time needed to review 
all available flight parameters without pre-defining a limited list of parameters. The data 
visualization tool, namely Flight Abnormality Visualization, gives an overview of the abnormality 
level of all available flight parameters across time, distance or other reference in the flight phase of 
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interest. It enables domain experts to quickly locate which flight parameters and when exhibit 
abnormal behaviors. 
Method 
Flight Abnormality Visualization aims to provide an overview of the abnormality level of a 
flight across flight parameters and time. Figure 4.10 illustrates the Flight Abnormality 
Visualization of a flight. The color of each block indicates the level of abnormality for a flight 
parameter at a particular time. Green means normal, red means abnormal and yellow means in 
between. All available flight parameters are listed along the y-axis. Temporal reference is provided 
along the x-axis using the distance to touchdown to be consistent with other plots for the 
approach phase. 
 
Figure 4.10 Flight Abnormality Visualization of Flight 1264410 
 
The flight shown in Figure 4.10 was a high energy approach, which exhibits abnormal 
behaviors in a number of flight parameters in the Flight Abnormality Visualization Tool. For 
example, in the set of basic flight parameters, the most abnormal ones are Roll Attitude and 
Vertical Speed, which contain a relatively large area of red blocks. Further inspection of Roll 
Attitude and Vertical Speed confirms the abnormality, as shown in Figure 4.11.  
Another feature of the Flight Abnormality Visualization is that each block is directly linked to 
a flight parameter plot - a user can click on a block of interest to open the plot of corresponding 
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flight parameter. It gives the user the ability to quickly inspect the original FDR data of 
individual flight parameters.  
 
Figure 4.11 Roll Attitude and Vertical Speed of Flight 1264410 
 
   
An index of abnormality is calculated to determine the color of a block in Flight Abnormality 
Visualization based on the model trained by ClusterAD-Data Sample algorithm. It measures the 
probability of a flight parameter value being normal at a particular time, given the distribution of 
that flight parameter at different times during a flight phase. It is calculated using the probability 
density function formulated as, 

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where 
p
tx  is flight parameter p’s value at time t, and   Kiw pipiip ,,1,,,   are GMM 
parameters related to parameter p. They are extracted from the GMM model trained in 
ClusterAD-Data Sample. 
The index calculated using Equation (4.1) gives a relative sense of the abnormality level 
comparing to all flight parameters’ samples over the phase of flight. Therefore, the color of each 
block is coded in a relative scale as well. The distribution of the index is mapped into a color scale 
that varies smoothly from green through yellow to red. A higher value of the index means normal 
and is colored in green, while a lower value of the index indicates abnormal and is colored in red. 
The mapping is based on percentiles: index values larger than 50th percentile are colored in green, 
index values smaller than 5th percentile are colored in red, and all index values in-between are 
linearly mapped into a color between green and red.   
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Chapter 5 Evaluation Studies 
5.1 Overview of Evaluation Studies 
5.1.1 Evaluation Challenges 
The evaluation of the cluster-based anomaly detection approach is challenging due to a 
number of factors. First, it is difficult to obtain FDR datasets. Because of labor agreements 
between airlines and pilot unions, the FDR data of routine airline flights are confidential and 
highly sensitive information in the U.S. and a number of other countries. Second, there is no 
validation information available against which detection results can be compared. Any abnormal 
flights detected by the anomaly detection approach are all from airlines’ routine flights without 
incidents, let alone accidents. The safety implications of these abnormal flights are difficult to be 
measured as it is beyond the capacity of existing methods. Third, it is difficult to compare cluster-
based anomaly detection with the current method Exceedance Detection because Exceedance 
Detection is conducted via proprietary software.  
5.1.2 Overview of Evaluation Studies 
Ideally, an evaluation of the cluster-based anomaly detection approach would be conducted on 
a FDR dataset, in which detection results would be compared against a validation standard or the 
current method Exceedance Detection. Given the challenges described in previous chapter, an 
ideal evaluation was not possible; instead, a number of evaluation studies were performed using 
available resources to gain some insights of the cluster-based anomaly detection approach. Two 
initial tests and three evaluation studies were conducted during different phases of this research, 
which are summarized in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of Evaluation Studies 
Testing/Evaluation Study 
To Evaluate 
Evaluation Method 
ClusterAD-
Flight 
ClusterAD-
Data Sample 
Data 
Visualization 
Tools 
Initial Testing of ClusterAD-
Flight 
x   N/A, Preliminary testing 
Initial Testing of ClusterAD-
Data Sample 
 x  N/A, Preliminary testing 
Evaluation Study I: 
Comparison of ClusterAD-
Flight, MKAD and Exceedance 
Detection* 
x   
Comparison with MKAD 
and Exceedance Detection; 
Domain expert review 
Evaluation Study II: 
Comparison of ClusterAD-
Flight, ClusterAD-Data 
Sample, MKAD and 
Exceedance Detection* 
x x  
Comparison with MKAD 
and Exceedance Detection 
Evaluation Study III: 
Evaluation of ClusterAD 
algorithms and Data 
Visualization Tools with 
Domain Experts 
x x x 
Comparison between 
ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample; 
Domain expert review; 
Questionnaires 
*Collaboration with NASA, restricted data access 
 
Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Flight 
In order to test if the method works, an initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight was performed 
using a preliminary FDR dataset obtained from an international airline. The initial testing is 
presented in Chapter 3 Section 3.5, after the method of ClusterAD-Flight is described.  
Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Data Sample 
Similarly, an initial testing of ClusterAD-Data Sample was performed in order to check if the 
method works. The initial testing is presented in Chapter 3 Section 3.7. 
Evaluation Study I: Comparison of ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and Exceedance Detection  
Since no validation information available against which anomaly detection results can be 
compared, ClusterAD-Flight was assessed via a comparison with Multiple Kernel Anomaly 
Detection (MKAD), an anomaly detection algorithm developed at NASA, and Exceedance 
Detection, baseline method currently in use. The three algorithms were applied on a same set of 
flight data. The abnormal flights detected by different algorithms were compared to assess the 
commonalities and differences across ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and Exceedance Detection.  
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This comparative study was conducted in collaboration with NASA, who provided a large set 
of FDR data and its associated exceedance information. However, access to this dataset was 
restricted. Flights detected could only be reviewed by domain experts within NASA. Special 
procedures and protocols need to be followed before releasing any information associated with 
original flight parameters. This study is presented in Section 5.2 of this chapter. 
Evaluation Study II: Comparison of ClusterAD-Flight, ClusterAD-Data Sample, MKAD and 
Exceedance Detection 
In order to examine its performance in detecting exceedances, ClusterAD-Data Sample was 
applied to the dataset used in Evaluation Study I, which was the only available dataset that had 
exceedance information. In this study, ClusterAD-Data Sample was compared with ClusterAD-
Flight and MKAD on the ability of detecting exceedances which are considered as known issues. 
Access to the dataset and results were also restricted by the collaboration agreement with NASA. 
Only aggregated statistical results were available in this study, e.g. number of exceedances, 
number of flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample, and number of commonly detected flights. 
Detailed information of specific flights was not available. This study is presented in Section 5.3 of 
this chapter. 
Evaluation Study III: Evaluation of ClusterAD algorithms and Data Visualization Tools with 
Domain Experts 
An overall evaluation study of detection algorithms (ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data 
Sample) and data visualization tools was performed in addition to Evaluation Study I and II. An 
experiment was designed to demonstrate the cluster-based anomaly detection process and to test 
the algorithms and data visualization tools. In the experiment, domain experts were asked to 
review a number of flights detected by ClusterAD algorithms. A number of data visualization 
tools were used to facilitate the review process. The experiment was designed to obtain domain 
experts feedback on the data visualization tools and to compare operational characteristics of 
flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. A comparison with the current 
approach Exceedance Detection was absent due to a lack of exceedance information. This study is 
presented in Section 5.4 in this chapter. 
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5.1.3 Overview of FDR Datasets 
In this thesis, three sets of FDR data were obtained during different phases of this research. A 
summary of the three datasets is presented in this section.  
Dataset I: 2881 flights of 13 aircraft model variants 
It consisted of 2881 flights including 7 aircraft types with 13 model variants, e.g. B777, A319, 
and A320. The largest set of a particular model included 365 B777 flights. The data were de-
identified so all flights were anonymous, and 69 flight parameters were available for each flight. 
No exceedance information was available for this dataset.  
Dataset I was exercised as a preliminary dataset for the initial testing of ClusterAD-Flight. 
Dataset II: 25519 A320 flights (via collaboration with NASA) 
Dataset II contained 25519 A320 flights landed at an anonymous airport. Each flight consisted 
of 367 discrete and continuous parameters sampled at 1 Hz with the average flight length between 
2 and 3 hours. Exceedance information were available through a separate analysis by a company 
specialized in current FOQA analysis working with NASA. However, access to this dataset was 
restricted. It was available through a collaboration agreement with NASA. Flights detected could 
only be reviewed by domain experts within NASA. Special procedures and protocols need to be 
followed before releasing any information associated with original flight parameters. 
Dataset II was employed in Evaluation Study I: Comparison of ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and 
Exceedance Detection and Evaluation Study II: Comparison of ClusterAD-Flight, ClusterAD-Data 
Sample, MKAD in Detecting Exceedances, because these two studies were conducted in 
collaboration with NASA. 
Dataset III: 10528 A320 flights 
Dataset III consisted of 10528 A320 flights that originated from or arrived at 36 airports. Each 
flight has 142 flight parameters sampled at 0.5 Hz or 0.1 Hz depending on the altitude during two 
flight phases: 1) from takeoff to 10000 ft AGL, 2) from 10000 ft AGL to touchdown. No 
exceedance information was available for this dataset and data entries were de-identified. The 
dataset was obtained from an oversea airline with the support of the FAA. 
Dataset III was utilized for the initial testing of ClusterAD-Data Sample and Evaluation 
Study III: Evaluation of ClusterAD algorithms and Data Visualization Tools with Domain 
Experts. Compared with Dataset II, Dataset III was more convenient to use because it was 
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obtained and available at MIT. Compared with Dataset I, Dataset III had a larger data size, 
which should improve cluster analysis performance and make it closer to real-world operations. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the three datasets and the associated evaluation studies. 
Table 5.2 Overview of FDR Datasets 
FDR Dataset Access 
Exceedance 
Information 
Evaluation Studies 
I 
2881 flights of 13 aircraft 
model variants (largest 
subset: 365 B777 flights) 
Full 
Not 
available  Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Flight 
II 
25519 A320 flights 
Limited, via 
collaboration 
with NASA 
Available 
 Evaluation Study I: Comparison of 
ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and 
Exceedance Detection 
 Evaluation Study II: Comparison of 
ClusterAD-Flight, ClusterAD-Data 
Sample, MKAD and Exceedance 
Detection 
III 
10528 A320 Flights 
Full 
Not 
available 
 Initial Testing of ClusterAD-Data 
Sample 
 Evaluation Study III: Evaluation of 
ClusterAD algorithms and Data 
Visualization Tools with Domain 
Experts 
 
 
5.2 Evaluation Study I: Comparison of ClusterAD-
Flight, MKAD and Exceedance Detection 
5.2.1 Background: Evaluation Challenges in Anomaly Detection 
A number of efforts have been made to develop algorithms to detect anomalies in sensory data 
from a complex system. These algorithms build a detection method directly from data collected, 
rather than based on prior knowledge of the system. Many of the algorithms face the challenge of 
validating new discoveries from real-world data, e.g. all abnormal flights detected are safe, and the 
degree of hazards are evaluated differently by different experts.  
In order to gain some insights of the performance of different algorithms, we conducted a 
cross-comparison study of three anomaly detection algorithms: ClusterAD-Flight, Multiple Kernel 
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Anomaly Detection (MKAD), and Exceedance Detection. The Exceedance Detection method is 
used as a baseline. It is an analysis tool widely used in airlines’ FOQA programs. It detects 
exceedance events when certain flight parameters exceed pre-specified thresholds. Only known 
safety concerns are examined by this method. All three methods were independently tested on a 
same set of flight data from an airline’s normal operations.  
5.2.2 Comparison Design and Setup 
The objective of this study was to compare three anomaly detection algorithms, ClusterAD-
Flight, MKAD, and Exceedance Detection. The three algorithms were applied on a same set of 
flight data, Dataset II. The abnormal flights detected by different algorithms were compared to 
assess the commonalities and differences across ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and Exceedance 
Detection.  
Algorithms 
This study focused on comparing ClusterAD-Flight with MKAD algorithm, using the 
traditional method, Exceedance Detection, as a baseline. ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD detect 
abnormal flights based on a model learned from the flight data, while the traditional method, 
Exceedance Detection, detects abnormal flights based on domain knowledge, standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), or other prior domain knowledge. 
ClusterAD-Flight. It is developed in this thesis. It detects abnormal flights using cluster 
analysis. It is designed to analyze flight phases that have standard procedures and clear time 
anchors, such as take-off and final approach. Details of the algorithm can be found in previous 
sections. ClusterAD-Flight algorithm can handle situations when multiple standard operations 
exist in the data; even the number of standard operations is unknown. In addition, ClusterAD-
Flight tends to work well with continuous flight parameters. However, it is not sensitive to the 
sequence of the discrete parameters (eg. sequences of switches in the cockpit); the discrete flight 
parameters are processed in the same way as the continuous ones, only state differences are 
observable in the algorithm. 
MKAD. Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection (MKAD) is an anomaly detection algorithm 
developed at NASA (Das et al., 2010). It is based on one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM). It 
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combines information of various data types simultaneously to identify anomalies by the “multiple 
kernels” approach, e.g. discrete, continuous, text, and network data. A separate kernel is built for 
each data type. The kernels of different data types are combined into a general kernel. The general 
kernel maps the original data into a high-dimensional feature space where the data are linearly 
separable. One-class SVM assumes all normal flights are alike and center on the origin in the 
feature space. It constructs an optimal hyper plane in the feature space to separate the abnormal 
flights from the normal ones. 
The kernels used in MKAD account both discrete parameters by their sequences, while 
continuous parameters by their converted sequences, using the normalized Longest Common 
Subsequence (nLCS) based kernel. Thus, MKAD is able to detect abnormal sequences of switches 
of cockpit operations.  
Exceedance Detection. Exceedance detection is the traditional flight data analysis method that 
is widely used in the airline industry. It consists of checking if particular flight parameters exceed 
the predefined limits under certain conditions. The list of flight parameters to watch and the 
limits of those parameters need to be specified by safety specialists in advance. The watch list is 
always chosen to coincide with the airline’s standard operating procedures, such as the pitch at 
takeoff, the speed at takeoff climb, the time of flap retraction, etc. Therefore, this approach 
requires a pre-defined watch list of key parameters under certain operational conditions and, in 
addition, precisely defined thresholds of the key parameters. Known safety issues can be 
accurately examined by Exceedance Detection; however, the unknown emerging risks remain 
latent. 
In this study, we leveraged on the results from a standard Exceedance Detection currently 
used by an airline. The standard Exceedance detection detects three levels of exceedance events. 
Level 1 indicates minor deviations from the performance target; Level 2 indicates moderate 
deviations, while Level 3 indicates the severest deviation from the target value. 
Algorithm Settings 
All three algorithms can be set at different sensitivity levels for detection. The sensitivity level 
of ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD is set by the “detection threshold” parameter. It determines how 
many flights in the dataset will be identified as abnormal. For example, by specifying a detection 
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threshold equals to 1%, the algorithm detects the top 1% most abnormal flights from the dataset. 
We compared ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD using a series of detection thresholds to test 
algorithm performance on different sensitivity levels (detection threshold = 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%). 
The comparison between ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD was always made on the same detection 
threshold to make the results comparable. 
Exceedance Detection detects “exceedance events” when aircraft performance fails to meet 
target value ranges during specific maneuvers. The industry normally uses three levels to detect 
exceedance events. Level 1 indicates minor deviation from the performance target, Level 2 
indicates moderate deviation, and Level 3 indicates the severest ones. Because Level 3 exceedance 
events are the issues of most concerns to airlines, the comparisons with Exceedance Detection were 
focused on Level 3 in this study. 
The algorithm settings are shown in Figure 5.1. Each cube is a scenario with the 
corresponding algorithm settings tested in the study. 
 
Figure 5.1 Testing Scenarios with Detection Sensitivity Levels 
 
Dataset 
The FDR data used in this study was Dataset II, which was from a commercial passenger 
airline, including 25519 A320 flights landing at a standard European airport. The analysis focused 
on the approach phase (from 6nm before touchdown to touchdown).  
Each flight consisted of 367 discrete and continuous parameters sampled at 1 Hz with the 
average flight length between 2 and 3 hours. However, we used a subset of the flight parameters 
(see Table 5.3) based on domain expert’s feedback in order to focus on detecting abnormalities in 
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crew operations. All flight parameters were analyzed by their original engineering values, except 
for the flap parameter. It is categorical in nature and has a finite number of values during the 
approach phase: 10, 15, 20, 40 degree. It was decomposed into 4 binary state variables (shown 
inTable 5.4) based on information from domain experts, because of data pre-processing 
requirements in MKAD. 
Exceedance information were available through a separate analysis by a company specialized 
in current FOQA analysis working with NASA. However, access to this dataset was restricted. It 
was available through a collaboration agreement with NASA.  
Table 5.3 List of Flight Parameters Used in the Cross-Comparison Study 
Data Type Flight Parameters 
Discrete Autopilot and all Autopilot related modes, Auto-throttle, Flight Director, Glide 
Slope, Stall Indicator, Flap Positions (derived parameter), Ground Proximity 
Warning System, Altitude Mode, Flare Mode, Flight Path Angle Mode. 
Continuous Altitude, Target Air Speed, Computed Air Speed, Engine-related Measures, Pitch 
Angle, Roll Angle, Rudder Position, Angle of Attack, Aileron Position, Stabilizer 
Position, Aircraft Gross Weight, Latitude, Longitude and Normal Accelerations, 
Derived parameters like Above Stall Speed, Vertical Speed. 
 
Table 5.4 Mapping Flap Position into Binary State Variable 
Flap Position Original Value 
(in degree) 
Binary States’ Values 
Flap0 Flap1 Flap2 FlapFull 
10 1 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 
20 0 0 1 0 
40 0 0 0 1 
 
5.2.3 Results Overview 
The total number of abnormal flights detected by each method is summarized in Table 5.5 
and Table 5.6. As expected, it increases with less restricted detection sensitivity for all three 
methods. The “detection threshold” controls the number of abnormal flights in ClusterAD-Flight 
and MKAD - more flights were considered as abnormal when a higher detection threshold was 
used, as shown in Table 5.5. In Exceedance Detection, the severity level is the main factor 
impacting the number of flights being detected. As shown in Table 5.6, almost all flights (18888 
out of 25519) were found to have at least one Level 1 exceedance event, while only less than 3% 
flights had at least one Level 3 exceedance event. 
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Table 5.5 Number of Abnormal Flights Detected by Data-Driven Algorithms 
 Detection Threshold 
 1% 3% 5% 10% 
ClusterAD-
Flight 
277 753 1271 2539 
MKAD 203 704 1206 2483 
 
Table 5.6 Number of Abnormal Flights Detected by Exceedance Detection 
 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Exceedance 
Detection 
729 3581 18888 
 
The results of ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD are expected to be different because of their 
different detection strengths: ClusterAD-Flight tends to work well with continuous flight 
parameters, while MKAD is able to incorporate the sequence of discrete flight parameters. This is 
confirmed by the results from comparing flights detected by the two algorithms. Each algorithm 
detected a set of flights at a detection threshold. A portion of the flights was commonly detected 
by both algorithms. The number of common flights detected by both varied from 33 (Detection 
Threshold = 1%), 147 (Detection Threshold = 3%), 355 (Detection Threshold = 5%), to 955 
(Detection Threshold = 10%). The agreement between the two methods increased when the 
detection criteria became more relaxed, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 Comparison between ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD 
 
A large number of auto-landing flights were detected as abnormal flights in MKAD. Among a 
total of 568 auto-landings in the dataset, 103 flights (18% of all auto-landings) were considered as 
abnormal by MKAD at a 10% detection threshold, while only 20 of them were considered 
abnormal by ClusterAD-Flight, as shown in Table 5.7. It can be explained by 1) MKAD is 
95 
 
sensitive to abnormal sequences in discrete flight parameters; 2) Auto-landings have different 
activities in discrete flight parameters comparing to ILS approach which is the majority of the 
approach types in the dataset. 
 
Table 5.7 Landing Type and Abnormal Flights Detected by Data-Driven Algorithms 
(detection threshold = 10%) 
 Landing Type 
 
ILS 
Approach 
Visual 
Landing 
Auto-
landing 
Non-
precision 
Landing 
Others 
All Flights 21960 2987 568 2 2 
Flights detected by 
ClusterAD-Flight 
1141 1160 20 2 0 
Flights Detected by 
MKAD 
961 1416 103 2 1 
 
5.2.4 Comparison between ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD 
In order to further understand the strength and the limitations of ClusterAD-Flight and 
MKAD, we reviewed the detected flights with domain experts in detail and cross-checked with the 
Exceedance detection results, to look for operational significance. We encountered practical issues 
during the reviewing process, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. We selected three groups 
from all the flights detected by any method:  
 Flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight on all detection thresholds, but not detected by 
MKAD on any detection threshold 
 Flights detected by MKAD on all detection thresholds, but not detected by 
ClusterAD-Flight on any detection threshold 
 Flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD on all detection thresholds 
In this section, we present several representative examples in each group. Two types of graphs 
are used to show the information of a flight: (1) Speed and flap setting during final approach; (2) 
Time-series plots of most distinctive flight parameters. Regarding to the third type, the same 
format is used to show all the distinctive flight parameters. The detected flight is shown by black 
lines. The patterns of most flights are depicted by blue bands. The dark blue bands indicate the 
25th to the 75th percentile of all flights data; the light blue bands encompass the 5th to the 95th 
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percentile. Respectively, the dark blue region contains 50% of the data, while the light blue region 
covers 90%. The wind plots and latitude & longitude plots in Type 2 graph do not have blue 
bands because those parameters (wind, latitude, longitude) were not included in the parameter list 
for anomaly detection algorithms. 
Operational characteristics of flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight, but not 
detected by MKAD 
ClusterAD-Flight algorithm detects abnormal flight by grouping normal flights into clusters. 
The time series of flight parameters are anchored by a specific time (eg. the application of takeoff 
power during take-off, or the touchdown in final approach). It requires the part of the data being 
analyzed have specific time anchors to make the comparison.  
ClusterAD-Flight tends to perform well with continuous flight parameters and is influenced by 
the magnitude of deviations. In this section, we present two examples of flights detected by 
ClusterAD-Flight, yet not by MKAD. Both flights had significant deviations in continuous flight 
parameters. ClusterAD-Flight can be considered as a variation of Exceedance detection as it works 
in a similar way in considering flight parameter deviations; however, ClusterAD-Flight 
automatically inspects all available flight parameters and makes the comparisons based on 
nominal values summarized from the data itself, rather than pre-specified. In addition, ClusterAD-
Flight can handle situations when multiple standard operations exist in the data and the number 
of standard operations is unknown. 
 
Very High Airspeed 
This flight was detected by ClusterAD-Flight at all detection thresholds, yet not detected by 
MKAD on any detection threshold. It was a very high airspeed ILS approach (Figure 5.3 and 
Figure 5.4). The airspeed profile was always much higher than the normal airspeed and also than 
the target airspeed until less than 2 nm before touchdown. As the airspeed was too high, the 
engine was set to idle until 3 nm before touchdown. Moreover, many flight parameters, e.g. the 
pitch, the target airspeed, the stabilizer position, the vertical speed, etc., had an abrupt change 
around 3.5 nm before touchdown. It is not clear what caused this change and why there was a 
significant drop in pitch even though the airspeed was too high.  
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This flight was also detected in Exceedance Detection. The detected events were “Speed High 
in Approach (at 1000ft)” (Level 3), “Speed High in Approach (at 500ft)” (Level 3), “Flaps Late 
Setting at Landing” (Level 2), and “Deviation below Glideslope (1000ft - 300ft)” (Level 2). In 
addition, five Level 1 events were also found in this flight.  
This example shows that ClusterAD-Flight can detect approaches with excessive airspeed, 
which is one type of rushed and unstable approach. The rushed and unstable approaches are one 
of the contributory factors in (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) and other approach-and-landing 
accidents, because they can result in insufficient time for the flight crew to correctly plan, prepare, 
and execute a safe approach. 
 
Figure 5.3 Very High Airspeed – Airspeeds, Flaps and Gear 
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Figure 5.4 Very High Airspeed 
 
Landing Runway Change 
Another type of flight detected by ClusterAD-Flight not by MKAD was flights with landing 
runway changes in final approach. The flight shown in Figure 5.5 is a representative example of 
this type. The flight was originally lined up for the right runway. Then, it turned and landed on 
the left runway. Although the ground reference position information (e.g. latitude and longitude) 
was not included in the anomaly detection analysis by ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD, ClusterAD-
Flight was able to capture the abnormal behaviors in other flight parameters caused by the change 
of runway turn and identified the flight as abnormal on all detection thresholds. 
None of these abnormal behaviors was considered severe by the standard in Exceedance 
Detection. No Level 3 or Level 2 events were detected in the flight for this flight phase. Only four 
Level 1 events were detected. This type of abnormal flight could be operationally benign, because 
the change of landing runway happens due to many reasons, e.g. ATC assignment to 
accommodate traffic flows, ILS instrument limitations, etc. However, to identify this type of 
abnormal operations and then to track the trend can help to understand the operations better, 
such as whether it happens at a particular airport, during a specific time of the day, or under 
certain weather conditions. Moreover, further analysis may bring insights on whether there is a 
correlation between the approaches with runway change and the unstable approaches. 
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Figure 5.5 Landing Runway Change 
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Operational characteristics of flights detected by MKAD, but not detected 
by ClusterAD-Flight 
MKAD models discrete sequences and continuous sequences for a given process using a 
normalized Longest Common Subsequence (nLCS) based kernel, which captures sequential 
features. Therefore it is able to detect some events that ClusterAD-Flight is not designed to 
detect. 
Unusual Auto Landing Configuration 
In this section we describe two flights identified by MKAD mostly due to some atypical 
patterns in the switching sequences generated from the discrete parameters. In both cases the 
flights used auto-land systems which have been designed to control the aircraft automatically 
during approach and landing. In this data set we had a small fraction (around 2% of the 25519 
flights) of auto-landing examples and the deviations from normal switching behaviors for auto-
landing made them statistically significant as compared to rest of the-flights. Auto-landing is 
mostly used in poor visibility conditions and/or bad weather where the crew can see the runway 
lights just few seconds before landing. In many such occasions with poor visibility conditions, 
visual landing may not be possible or may be considered unsafe and therefore auto-landing is 
preferred. The presence of automatic guidance systems with human in-the-loop makes the auto-
land an extremely accurate and safe maneuver. However there are strict requirements which are 
imposed by the authorities on airborne elements and ground environment, as well as special crew 
qualification for auto-landing. 
The first flight engaged auto-landing without full flap setting. Under normal circumstances the 
auto-land is executed with both autopilots engaged and with flaps configured full. The use here of 
the flap setting prior to full introduced some differences from usual auto-land patterns. Out of all 
auto-landing examples, more than 90% of flights performed this operation with full flap settings. 
While legal from an operational stand point this was still reported by the algorithm due to 
some statistically significant activities (or signatures) in parameters like autopilot and autopilot 
modes and flight directors. The exceedance based method indicated “Pitch High at Touchdown”, 
“Short Flare Time” and “Short Flare Distance” with considerable severities (Level 2 and Level 3). 
The second example was another atypical auto-land configuration. In this flight the flaps were 
configured full. The weather was reported as foggy with 0.1 mi visibility. It is common to use only 
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one autopilot for an approach which does not require an auto-land. The autopilot is then 
disengaged when the runway is in sight or at least by the minimum charted descent altitude. 
Procedures specify that an approach which requires an auto-land, however, must be started with 
two autopilots. If one autopilot then fails, a “fail-operational state” exists and the automatic 
landing can be completed. This flight departed from normal operational requirements by utilizing 
only one autopilot for the entire approach and auto-land. This scenario could be of interest 
because under bad weather conditions (like extremely low visibility conditions) with further 
degradation of the system the auto-landing capability may be lost at an extremely inopportune 
time. The algorithm was able to find it due to the uncharacteristic settings of autopilots for 
landing aircraft. For example, out of all auto-landing examples, only 2 flights with different tail 
numbers performed this kind of operation. The exceedance based method indicated “Speed Low at 
Touch down” and “Flaps Questionable Setting at Landing” with considerable severities (Level 2 
and Level 3). 
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Operational characteristics of flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and 
MKAD  
Common flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD are that have significantly 
different data patterns from other flights. A number of flight parameters of these flights are 
distinctively different compared to the nominal values of most flights. Some of the common flights 
indicate interesting operational implications, while some of them are benign as they are abnormal 
due to the low occurrence of the operation. Four examples of the common flights are presented in 
detail: High energy approach, High-airspeed with low-power approach, Recycling flight director, 
and Influence of wind. 
 
High Energy Approach 
The high energy approach was a flight that is detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD 
on all detection thresholds. There are two basic conditions which may result in a high energy 
approach - the aircraft may be too high or too fast or both. This flight has been categorized as a 
high energy approach with unusually high air speed when compared to a set of reference flights 
landing at that airport. 
The flight review with domain expert suggested that this flight might indicate an energy state 
awareness problem. The speed profile and power profile of this flight could be precursors to 
runway excursion for shorter runways. The high speed was not due to the wind. Ideally, in these 
cases it should be a go around. The landing operation was performed in a cloudy weather 
condition with average visibility of 8.2 miles and with almost no wind. “Flap 0”, “Flap 1” and 
“Flap 2” along with the landing gear was deployed before 1800 ft (or 6 nm from touch down). 
During this process, a gradual turn was initiated to align with the runway in preparation for 
landing. This flight intercepted the glide slope (see altitude plot in Figure 5.6) from below and was 
slower than most other flights at the beginning of the approach. During this period the pitch was 
high. Immediately after this the pilot spooled up the engines for some time to increase the speed. 
This was followed by lowering the pitch with engine idle which further accelerated the aircraft. 
The target airspeed (140 knots) was higher than most others (126-130 knots). The power was high 
until 3 nm before touchdown, which resulted in a high and unstable airspeed and a significant 
decrease in N1 for the rest of the approach. In addition, the pitch angle profile and altitude profile 
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also showed signs of unstable approach. At 500 ft the pilot pulled the nose up slightly early to 
ensure rapid deceleration. The effect of that can be clearly seen in normal acceleration and vertical 
speed profiles. The anomaly detection algorithms found this flight atypical due to the combined 
effect of the deviations of several continuous parameters.  
This is an interesting example that can be detected by ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD, but may 
be overlooked by the Exceedance detection method. The exceedance based approach reported 
Level 1 exceedance events, namely “Speed High in Approach (at 50 ft)”, “Pitch High at 
Touchdown”, “Path Low in Approach (at 1200 ft)”, “Long Flare Time” and “Approach fast 500 
RAD”. The findings of the anomaly detection methods provide a clear picture on the unusual 
energy management scenario, however the exceedance detection method conclude it as a normal 
flight. 
 
Figure 5.6 High Energy Approach 
 
High-Airspeed with Low-Power Approach 
One type of abnormal approaches that can be detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD 
was the high-airspeed and low-power approaches. Figure 5.7 is an example of this style of 
approach. It was a visual landing. The airspeed was always high and the engine was set to idle 
until 1 nm before touchdown. Procedure calls for the engines to be spooled up for the entire final 
approach so that instantaneous power adjustments can be made. Other flight parameters also 
show abnormal patterns compared to the patterns in the majority of flights. For example, the 
altitude profile was above the normal altitude profile from 5 nm to 1 nm before touchdown, the 
pitch was relatively low until 2 nm before touchdown; the roll angle had a significant amount of 
activity at the beginning of the final approach, etc. 
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Although this flight landed safely, this type of approach is not recommended. The test on this 
dataset shows that both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD can catch this type of anomaly. Moreover, 
Exceedance detection confirmed that this type of anomaly was operationally significant. The 
exceedance detection identified four Level 3 events, one Level 2 event, and four Level 1 events in 
the approach part for this flight. The Level 3 events were “Speed High in Approach (at 1000ft)”, 
“Speed High in Approach (at 500ft)”, “Low Power on Approach” and “Approach Fast 500 RAD”. 
The Level 2 exceedance was “Pitch High at Touchdown”. 
 
Figure 5.7 High-Airspeed with Low Power 
 
 
Recycling Flight Director 
The main contribution toward the abnormality of this flight came from an atypical event in 
discrete parameters as a result of change in runway and another error of commission. The first 
event was related to automation disconnection. This flight was completely hand flown and was 
initially configured for the right runway. Once the new runway was assigned and the required 
maneuvering was initiated to align with the left runway, the crew had to recycle the flight 
directors in order to get to the default modes of Heading and Vertical Speed. The second event 
was related to mode switching and we are unable to reach any hypothesis on why the pilot would 
take such an action. The transition from “vertical speed mode” to “open climb mode” around 1500 
ft was an inappropriate move by the pilot as the missed approach altitude has already been set 
and the “open climb mode” will spool up the engines in order to climb to that altitude right away. 
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However it is clear from Figure 5.9 that the pilot immediately corrected this mistake and 
continued to hand fly the aircraft appropriately. A level 2 exceedance in “Speed High in Approach 
(at 1000ft)” was reported, but may have been unrelated to all the forgoing actions. 
 
Figure 5.8 Recycling Flight Director – Change in Runway 
 
Figure 5.9 Recycling Flight Director  
 
Influence of Wind 
Both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD found this flight (Figure 5.10) as abnormal because of 
deviations in multiple continuous parameters, combined with various mode transitions. Some of 
these deviations were not immediately obvious when examining individual parameter plots, 
however they combined to create an atypical flight. The discrete parameter values showed that 
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one autopilot (AP 1) was used and later the pilot disconnected the autopilots and proceeded 
manually with the rest of the approach and landing. Moreover both the flight directors were 
recycled immediately after that. The first hypothesis was that there might be a change in parallel 
runway and the pilot had to disconnect the automation while aligning the aircraft to the new 
runway assigned to him. But the latitude-longitude plot confirmed that there was no “runway 
change”. The second and a more likely hypothesis was that the switching of the autopilot and 
flight directors could be part of an auto approach process. The pilot first disconnected the 
autopilots once the necessary visibility of the runway was achieved, then recycled the flight 
directors to engage the default modes and later decided to hand fly the aircraft. Another 
interesting observation is the missing auto flight lateral mode. Further investigations revealed that 
the “NAV” mode was active throughout the earlier part of the flight and was deactivated right 
before the final approach. This would not happen and is probably an artifact of the recording 
process. Any time either an autopilot or a flight director is engaged both a lateral mode and a 
vertical mode must be in use. 
The entire operation was performed in an extremely windy condition. Though wind was not 
part of the analysis but the wind plots in Figure 5.10 helps to explain atypical fluctuations in 
some of the parameters like target airspeed, rudder and lateral/normal acceleration. Exceedance 
based model didn’t detect any event for this flight. 
 
Figure 5.10 Influence of Wind 
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5.2.5 Comparison with Exceedance Detection 
Among different levels of exceedance, Level 3 exceedance events are the most severe and raise 
concerns at airlines. Thus, Exceedance Detection at Level 3 was used as the baseline to compare 
the performance of ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD. Table 5.8 shows the results of comparing the 
flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight with Exceedance Level 3, and the flights detected by MKAD 
with Exceedance Level 3. It is noted that ClusterAD-Flight has detected more flights with Level 3 
Exceedance than MKAD on all different detection thresholds.  
Table 5.8 Comparison of ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD in Detecting Exceedances 
 
Number of flights with Level 3 Exceedance 
detected by 
  ClusterAD-Flight MKAD 
Detection 
Threshold 
1% 39 12 
3% 93 31 
5% 143 53 
10% 220 86 
 
The results show that ClusterAD-Flight can be considered as a variation of Exceedance 
Detection. It looks for deviations between abnormal values and normal values. When most 
operations are following standards, the normal values are the same as the target values in 
Exceedance Detection. The advantage of ClusterAD-Flight over Exceedance detection is that 
ClusterAD-Flight considers all the available flight parameters simultaneously and does not need a 
pre-specified list of queries. 
On the other hand, a number of flights were detected by Exceedance Detection, but not by 
ClusterAD-Flight or MKAD. Examples of these flights are shown in this section, which are the 
top two flights with the maximum number of Level 3 exceedance events in the approach phase. 
Table 5.9 shows the type of exceedance events identified by the exceedance detection method for 
all three severities. 
Table 5.9 Top 2 Flights with Level 3 Exceedance 
Flight 1  
Level 3 
Pitch Rate High at Landing,  
Short Flare Time,  
Tail Strike Risk at Landing 
Level 2 Pitch High at Touchdown 
Level 1 
Height High at Threshold, 
Short Flare Distance 
Flight 2  
Level 3 
Speed High in Approach (at 1000 ft),  
Speed High in Approach (at 1000 ft),  
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Low Power on Approach 
Level 2 
Deviation above Glideslope (1000 ft - 300 ft),  
Go around 
Level 1 
Pitch High at Touchdown, 
Rate of Descent High in Approach (2000 ft - 1000 ft),  
Approach Fast 500 RAD 
 
Neither ClusterAD-Flight nor MKAD could detect those flights because both algorithms 
identify abnormal flights by considering all available flight parameters, while Exceedance 
Detection examine particular flight parameters under certain conditions. The abnormality level of 
a flight in anomaly detection methods is the combined effect of how abnormal a flight parameter 
is at an instance, how long the abnormality lasts for that flight parameter, and how many flight 
parameters are abnormal. The flight parameter plots of Flight 1 and Flight 2 (Figure 5.11 and 
Figure 5.12) show that most of the parameters are within the blue bands for most of the approach 
phase. The events detected by Exceedance detection for Flight 1 and Flight 2 are specific 
deviations at a particular time, such as landing, touchdown, 1000 ft, 500 ft, etc. A short time 
deviation of a few flight parameters may not be able to bring the flight to top of the abnormal list 
generated in ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD. Exceedance Detection is designed to search for 
problems which are foreseen. Instead, the data driven algorithms are created to search for 
unknown abnormalities. For example, in the case of Flight 1 (Figure 5.11), Exceedance Detection 
is finely tuned to pick out the high pitch rate, because it was specifically looking for this problem. 
“Pitch rate” was not included in the parameter list of data driven analysis; so Flight 1 was not 
picked up by ClusterAD-Flight or MKAD. Another example is the “Speed High in Approach” 
exceedance events in Flight 2. Although the overall profile of computed airspeed looks normal 
from the Figure 5.12, there are two small deviations in computed airspeed. The difference between 
computed airspeed and target airspeed around those deviations resulted in the speed related 
exceedance events. ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD are not sensitive to such small deviations in a 
short period. Thus they didn’t find Flight 2 as abnormal. 
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Figure 5.11 Exceedance Detection – Flight 1 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Exceedance Detection – Flight 2 
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5.2.6 Study Summary 
 A comparison of ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD, and a traditional method, Exceedance 
Detection, was made on a common aviation data set. Results showed that ClusterAD-Flight was 
able to detect operationally significant anomalies, which were not captured by Exceedance 
detection.  
There was some overlap among anomalies detected by ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and 
Exceedance Detection, yet, each algorithm had its unique strengths. ClusterAD-Flight worked 
better with continuous flight parameters; MKAD was more sensitive to the sequence of discrete 
parameters; Exceedance Detection was accurate in examining known issues. Therefore, the 
strengths from different methods shall be combined. 
5.3 Evaluation Study II: Comparison of ClusterAD-
Flight, ClusterAD-Data Sample, and MKAD in Detecting 
Exceedances 
The comparison study of ClusterAD-Flight, MKAD and Exceedance Detection showed that 
both ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD had limited capability to detect Level 3 Exceedance events, 
which are considered as known issues in the traditional FOQA analysis method. This was one of 
factors that motivated the development of ClusterAD-Data Sample. After ClusterAD-Data Sample 
was developed, Evaluation Study II was performed to assess ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-
Data Sample, MKAD and Exceedance Detection. 
5.3.1 Comparison Design and Setup 
The objective of this study was to compare ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-Flight, 
MKAD, and Exceedance Detection. The four algorithms were applied on a same set of flight data, 
Dataset II. This study focused on the agreement with Exceedance Detection because access to the 
dataset and results were also restricted by the collaboration agreement with NASA. Only 
aggregated statistical results were available in this study, e.g. number of exceedances, number of 
flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample, and number of commonly detected flights. Detailed 
information of specific flights was not available. 
 
111 
 
Algorithms 
This study compared anomaly detection algorithms: ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-
Flight, MKAD, and Exceedance Detection. CluserAD-Data Sample is also a cluster-based anomaly 
detection algorithm which is developed in this thesis. It is similar to ClusterAD-Flight but uses a 
different data transformation technique. Details of the other three algorithms can be found in 
Section 5.2.2.  
Algorithm Settings 
All four algorithms can be set at different sensitivity levels for detection.  
The sensitivity level of ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD is set by the 
“detection threshold” parameter. We used a series of detection thresholds to test algorithm 
performance on different sensitivity levels (detection threshold = 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%). The 
comparison among ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD was always made on 
the same detection threshold to make the results comparable. 
Exceedance Detection detects “exceedance events” when aircraft performance fails to meet 
target value ranges during specific maneuvers. The industry normally uses three levels to detect 
exceedance events. Level 1 indicates minor deviation from the performance target, Level 2 
indicates moderate deviation, and Level 3 indicates the severest ones. Because Level 3 exceedance 
events are the issues of most concerns to airlines, the comparisons with Exceedance Detection were 
focused on Level 3 in this study. 
Dataset 
The Dataset II, which was used in Evaluation Study I, was used again in this study. It 
included 25519 A320 flights landing at a standard European airport. The analysis focused on the 
approach phase (from 6nm before touchdown to touchdown). Details of this dataset can be found 
in Section 5.2.2. 
5.3.2 Results 
Among different levels of exceedance, Level 3 exceedance events are the most severe and raise 
concerns at airlines. Thus, Exceedance Detection at Level 3 was used as the baseline to compare 
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the performance of ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD. Figure 5.13 shows the 
results of comparing the flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample, ClusterAD-Flight and 
MKAD with Exceedance Level 3. ClusterAD-Data Sample detected more flights with Level 3 
events than ClusterAD-Flight and MKAD across all detection thresholds, as shown in Figure 5.13. 
For example, when the detection threshold was set to detect the top 10% abnormal flights, 70% of 
flights with Level 3 events were identified by ClusterAD-Data Sample, in contrast, only 12% were 
identified by MKAD and 30% by ClusterAD-Flight. 
 
Figure 5.13 Percentage of Flights with Level 3 Exceedance Events Detected by MKAD, 
ClusterAD-Flight, and ClusterAD-Data Sample 
 
5.3.3 Study Summary 
In this study, ClusterAD-Data Sample showed improvement in detecting flights with severer 
exceedance events. This result was expected because the cluster analysis in ClusterAD-Data 
Sample is based on data samples, which are also the basis of defining exceedance events. However, 
the agreement with Exceedance Detection measures only one aspect of the detection algorithm. It 
is not clear whether ClusterAD-Data Sample detects new types of safety issues, which are not 
included in Exceedance Detection, better or not. 
5.4 Evaluation Study III: Evaluation of ClusterAD 
algorithms and Data Visualization Tools with Domain 
Experts 
An evaluation study was performed to evaluate the operational significance of flights detected 
by ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample as perceived by domain experts, and to test the 
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data visualization tools. In the evaluation, domain experts were asked to review a number of 
flights detected by anomaly detection algorithms. Data visualization tools described in previous 
chapter were used to facilitate the review process. The evaluation was designed to obtain domain 
experts feedback on the data visualization tools and to compare perceived operational significance 
of flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. The comparison between 
ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample and results on data visualization tools are 
presented in this section. 
5.4.1 Evaluation Design 
Objective 
The objectives of this evaluation were 1) to demonstrate and test the data visualization tools; 
2) to compare perceived operational significance of flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample.  
Dataset 
A FDR dataset, Dataset III, was obtained from an oversea airline with the support of the 
FAA, which consisted of 10528 A320 flights that originated from or arrived at 36 airports. Each 
flight has 142 flight parameters sampled at 0.5 Hz or 0.1 Hz depending on the altitude during two 
flight phases: 1) from takeoff to 10000 ft AGL, 2) from 10000 ft AGL to touchdown. No 
exceedance information was available for this dataset and data entries were de-identified.  This 
study focused on the approach phase: from 6nm before touchdown to touchdown. 
Independent Variables 
With the two objectives, the evaluation was designed to have three independent variables: 
type of flight parameter plot, availability of flight abnormality visualization, and detection 
algorithm, as shown in Figure 5.14.  
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Figure 5.14 Evaluation Design: Independent Variables 
 
The first two of the independent variables were related to the first objective: to demonstrate 
and test the data visualization tools. Two types of flight parameter plots were tested. Type I of 
the flight parameter plot displays median and percentiles as reference information, as shown in 
Figure 5.15. Type II only displays median as the reference, as shown in Figure 5.16. Type I 
provides more information than Type II, but it might introduce bias from the distribution of the 
dataset. As to the second independent variable, it was designed to test if there is any benefit from 
providing the Flight Abnormality Visualization tool Figure 5.17.  
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Figure 5.15 Type I Flight Parameter Plot: Median + Percentiles 
 
Figure 5.16 Type II Flight Parameter Plot: Median only 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Flight Abnormality Visualization 
 
Data visualization tools were presented using one of the four configurations by combining of 
the first two independent variables at different levels: A) Type I flight parameter plot + Flight 
abnormality probe, B) Type II flight parameter plot + Flight abnormality probe, C) Type I flight 
parameter plot only, D) Type II flight parameter plot only, as illustrated in Error! Reference 
ource not found.. Each subject experienced all the four configurations in order. 
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Figure 5.18 Four Configurations of Data Visualization Tools 
 
Lastly, the third independent variable was directly related to the second objective: to compare 
ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. Flights detected by different anomaly detection 
algorithms were organized into three groups: 1) commonly detected by ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample; 2) detected by ClusterAD-Flight; 3) detected by ClusterAD-Data 
Sample.  
Flights to Be Reviewed  
ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were applied to Dataset III. At each level of 
detection threshold (top x% abnormal flights), there were flights commonly detected by 
ClusterAD-Data Sample and ClusterAD-Flight, and unique ones detected by either algorithm. The 
results of ClusterAD-Data Sample and ClusterAD-Flight were expected to be different because 
they use different detection strategies. Comparing flights detected by the two algorithms, a 
portion of the flights was always commonly detected by both algorithms at different detection 
thresholds. The number of common flights detected by both varied from 20 (Detection Threshold 
= 0.5%), 55 (Detection Threshold = 1%), to 157 (Detection Threshold = 3%), as shown in Figure 
5.19. The percentage of common detection kept relatively constant at different detection 
thresholds. 
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Figure 5.19 Abnormal Flights Detected by ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample  
(Dataset: 10528 A320 flights) 
 
Flights were selected from those detected by two algorithms at detection threshold = 0.5%. 
There were eighty-eight flights were identified by either ClusterAD-Flight or ClusterAD-Data 
Sample at that detection threshold. These flights were organized into three groups: 
 Flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample (20 flights) 
 Flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight only (35 flights) 
 Flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample only (33 flights) 
Ideally, all these flights would be reviewed by domain experts. However, limited by the 
number of domain experts and time of each domain expert available in this study, an initial 
analysis was performed to reduce the number of flights need to be reviewed by domain experts. 
The initial analysis selected flights with representative data patterns. Since there were a finite 
number of data patterns observed in each of the three groups, a flight was select to represent a 
type of data pattern in every group. After the initial analysis, sixteen flights were selected for 
domain experts to review, as shown in Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 Flights Selected for Expert Review from Abnormal Flights at Detection Threshold 
= 0.5% 
Detected by ClusterAD-Flight & 
ClusterAD-Data Sample 
Detected by 
ClusterAD-Flight 
Detected by ClusterAD-
Data Sample 
1209099 1209326 1200517 
1296837 1264410 1222631 
1320982 1314619 1316840 
1341150 1349379 1366200 
1360984  1373774 
1384717   
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1393754   
Total          7 4 5 
 
Randomization  
Every participant was assigned to review all 16 flights, which were ordered into four groups 
with equal size. Flights in a group were presented using one of the four configurations of data 
visualization tools. Each subject experienced all the four configurations in order. The order was 
randomized between subjects to counterbalance the learning effect. The assignment of which flight 
using which configuration of data visualization tools was also randomized between subjects, so 
that minimum bias was introduced, not always presenting particular flight features via a 
configuration of data visualization tools. 
Dependent Variables  
The comparison between ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample was based on an 
operational review questionnaire, which aimed to assess each flight’s perceived operational 
characteristics from three aspects: its abnormality level in operational sense, its safety 
implications, and detailed description about its abnormal behavior when applicable. The 
operational review questionnaire is shown in Figure 5.20.  
 
Figure 5.20 Operational Review Questionnaire 
 
119 
 
A standard usability questionnaire, the After-Scenario Questionnaire (ASQ) (Lewis, 1991a, 
1991b, 1995), was used to evaluate the data visualization tools, as shown in Figure 5.21.   
 
Figure 5.21 Data Visualization Tools Evaluation Questionnaire 
 
 
5.4.2 Apparatus, Participants, and Procedure 
Apparatus  
The evaluation was administrated online, in order to facilitate access experts at different 
locations. HTML and JavaScript were used to develop the online test-bed. In the test-bed, flights 
to be reviewed were presented via data visualization tools, followed by the questionnaires. 
Limitations of the test bed should be noted. It focuses on the data visualizations tools, instead of 
the entire expert review process. For example, other functions commonly involved in the review 
process, e.g. 3D animation of the flight, were not included in the test bed. 
Participants 
With the help of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and professional pilot forums, four 
domain experts volunteered to participate and completed the evaluation. The four domain experts 
are airline pilots with more than 48,600 hours of flying experience combined. All domain experts 
have experience with FOQA program and some are in charge of a FOQA program. 
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Procedure  
A tutorial was given to each participant at the beginning of the evaluation through web 
conference, which discussed the nature of the evaluation and explained the context and use of the 
interface. A practice case was given to each participant after the tutorial, which presented a flight 
with known abnormalities in particular flight parameters. After the participant was confirmed 
that he/she understood the use of the interface, a link of the review session was sent to the 
participant.  
In the review session, 16 flights detected by ClusterAD algorithms were reviewed by each 
participant. During the review of each flight, its information was presented in a format as shown 
in Figure 5.22. Flight basic information was available to all flights; Flight parameter plot was 
given as either Type I or Type II; the Flight Abnormality Visualization tool was only available to 
half of the flights. After the flight information presentation, the data visualization tools 
questionnaire and operational review questionnaire were followed. 
The review session had 16 flights to be reviewed for each participant. The participants did not 
need to finish all the flights at once. Uncompleted review information was stored, and the review 
process could be continued from where it was left. 
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Figure 5.22 Format of Presenting Flight Information 
 
 
5.4.3 Results on Perceived Operational Significance of Abnormal 
Flights 
Confounding Factor 
Results may be confounded by the fact that each flight was reviewed by four domain experts, 
each of whom used one of the four configurations of data visualization tools. Perceived operational 
significance of a same flight could be a result of the difference in visualization tools and the 
difference between experts. Ideally, each flight should be reviewed by multiple domain experts 
under exactly the same visualization configurations. Conclusions drawn from this evaluation, 
especially on the inter-rater agreement, should be treated with caution because of this confounding 
factor. To eliminate this confounding factor, further evaluations are needed in the next step of this 
research. 
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Results Overview  
 
Figure 5.23 Operational Review Results of Question 1 and Question 2 
 
The results of flights’ perceived abnormality level and perceived safety implications in the 
operational review questionnaire across all selected flights are summarized in Figure 5.23. Based 
on the results, several observations were made: 
1) The degree of perceived operational abnormality varied across flights. Evaluated by 
domain experts, some flights were operationally abnormal and representing safety hazards, 
some were operationally abnormal but not indicating any safety hazards and some were 
totally benign.  
2) Flights’ perceived “level of abnormality” measured by Question 1 correlates with the 
perceived “degree of representing safety hazards” by Question 2 based on the ratings by 
domain experts, and the correlation is statistically significant based on Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient (rs = 0.90, p = 1×10
-24). This indicates that the statement “a flight 
is operationally abnormal.” is perceived similar to the statement “a flight represents safety 
hazards” by domain experts. 
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3) The inter-rater agreement varies across flights for both “level of abnormality” (Question 1) 
and “degree of representing safety hazards” (Question 2). For example, Flight 1296837 was 
always considered as abnormal and representing safety hazards by all experts, while Flight 
1366200 was evaluated as normal and safe by two experts but was considered as abnormal 
and unsafe by the other two experts. The Krippendorff's Alpha was calculated as a 
measure of inter-rater agreement, shown in Table 5.11. The result exhibits that Group 1 
flights that were detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample have a 
higher agreement among experts, Group 2 is lower, and Group 3 is the lowest. Group 3 has 
the lowest inter-rater agreement, which could be explained by special characteristics of 
flights in this group. Flights in Group 3 had many different types of instantaneous 
anomalies, the perceived degree of abnormality depended on how many instantaneous 
anomalies were identified by domain experts and the level of operational impact of those 
instantaneous anomalies. 
The low inter-rater agreement could also be caused by the difference in data visualization 
configurations. Since only four domain experts participated in this study and four 
configurations were used, every flight was reviewed by four domain experts using four 
different configurations. The disagreement of a flight could be caused by difference in 
personal opinions, as well as the difference in visualization tools. 
 
Table 5.11 Inter-rater Agreement across Groups 
 
Flights Detected 
by Both 
Flights Detected 
by ClusterAD-
Flight 
Flights Detected 
by ClusterAD-
Data Sample 
Question 1:  
The flight is abnormal 
0.38 0.27 0.04 
Question 2: 
The flight represents 
safety hazards 
0.38 0.20 0.10 
Measured by Krippendorff's Alpha:  
α = 1 indicates perfect agreement; α = 0 indicates the absence of agreement 
 
 
Comparison between ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample   
The operational review questionnaire also included a detailed description of flight’s operational 
characteristics. For each group, a few examples in each group are presented in detail to further 
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evaluate the strengths and weakness of ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample, as shown 
in Table 5.12. 
 
Table 5.12 Operational Review Summary 
  Abnormal? 
 
Hazardous? Example  
Group Flight P1 P2 P3 P4 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4  
Detected by 
Both 
1296837 4 4 4 4 
 
4 4 4 4  
1320982 4 2 3 4 
 
3 2 3 4  
1341150 3 4 3 2 
 
3 3 3 2  
1360984 2 3 2 2 
 
1 3 2 2  
1384717 4 2 2 2 
 
4 2 2 2  
1393754 3 2 2 1 
 
2 2 2 1  
 1209099 1 1 3 2 
 
1 1 3 2  
Detected by 
ClusterAD-
Flight 
1264410 5 4 4 5 
 
5 3 4 5  
1349379 4 4 2 2 
 
4 4 2 2  
1209326 4 1 4 2 
 
5 1 3 2  
1314619 4 2 3 1 
 
2 1 3 1  
Detected by 
ClusterAD-
Data Sample 
1316840 4 1 3 2 
 
4 1 3 2  
1366200 4 2 2 4 
 
4 1 2 4  
1373774 2 2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 2  
1222631 1 2 3 2 
 
1 2 3 2  
 1200517 1 1 3 2 
 
1 1 3 2  
Legend:   1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly agree 
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Operational characteristics of flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight only 
 
Figure 5.24 Operational Characteristics of Flights Detected by ClusterAD-Flight Only 
  
All flights in this group were considered as operationally abnormal by at least one expert. The 
operational characteristics are summarized in Figure 5.24. Two examples are presented and 
discussed: one was agreed by all experts as operationally abnormal (Flight 1264410), the other one 
was perceived opposite among experts regarding its degree of abnormality. 
 
Flight 1264410 - High, fast, and high-rate-of-descent unstabilized approach.  
This flight was rated as operationally abnormal and representing safety hazards by all domain 
experts. It was above the glideslope profile until 2nm before touchdown with high airspeed and 
high rate of descent. Engine thrust was at idle until 1.3nm from touchdown. The vertical speed 
was almost 4000fpm at 3000ft HAT, and it reduced to 1000fpm at 1000ft HAT. One expert noted 
that the roll attitude profile indicated turns on final approach, which might be intended to 
increase distance to the runway to provide room to lose altitude. All observations indicate this was 
an unstabilized approach. 
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Figure 5.25 Flight 1264410 - High, fast, and high-rate-of-descent unstabilized approach 
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Flight 1349379 - unusual energy profile 
Two domain experts thought this flight as normal, while other two experts found abnormality 
in this flight. One expert identified abnormalities in the flap setting and airspeed - "Coming in 
with Flaps1 by 6 nm instead of the usual Flaps 2” and “airspeed high at 1000ft HAT.” Another 
expert identified abnormalities around 2nm before touchdown. The thrust had been left at idle 
until 2nm and then increased to normal setting. The expert commented the application of thrust 
was a bit late in his experience, permitting the Calibrated airspeed (CAS) and groundspeed (GS) 
reduced by 10kts, which might be below Vapp, as CAS and GS was increased and thrust 
responded rapidly at 1nm. He suggested that a call to the crew using standard FOQA principles 
would be required to clarify what was occurring between 3nm and touchdown.  
 
Figure 5.26 Flight 1349379 - unusual energy state at 1nm before touchdown 
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Operational characteristics of flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample 
only 
 
Figure 5.27 Operational Characteristics of Flights Detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample Only 
 
Operational characteristics of flights in this group are summarized in Figure 5.27. None of the 
flights in the group were agreed by four domain experts. One example with conflicting ratings 
from different experts is Flight 1366200. Another general observation in this group is that flights 
exhibited instantaneous anomalies in data patterns, but not all were considered as operationally 
abnormal. A typical example is Flight 1373774, whose abnormality in wind related parameters was 
not considered as operationally abnormal by domain experts. 
 
Flight 1366200 - manual flight with no flight director 
This flight was considered as operationally abnormal by two experts, but normal by the other 
two experts. Experts who considered it abnormal commented this flight came in at correct speed 
but slightly high, power was idle until about 2nm, roll was instable, and it was not stabilized at 
1000ft HAT. One interesting observation was that experts who rated it as normal found the 
vertical speed value abnormal between 4.3nm and 2.2nm and brake pressure abnormal between 
6nm and 5nm, but still thought the flight was operationally normal. One expert explained the 
vertical speed returned to stabilized values at about 700ft above airport elevation and the brake 
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pressure spike may be a Landing Gear Control Interface Unit (LGCIU) system test as there are no 
reasons for brake application at this point in the flight, nor does such application affect the flight. 
This example shows that abnormality in data patterns was detected by ClusterAD-Data 
Sample and confirmed by domain experts. However, the abnormal data pattern does not always 
indicate abnormality by operational standards. 
 
Figure 5.28 Flight 1366200 - manual flight with no flight director 
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Flight 1373774 - high wind approach 
All domain experts agreed that this flight was a normal approach with an initially-strong 
headwind and crosswind. The engine thrust had abnormal data pattern between 6nm and 3nm 
before touchdown. It was because the glide slope was intercepted from below and flap was taken 
at 4nm. This pattern was uncommon in this dataset, but it was considered as a very good fuel-
saving, noise-reduced decelerated approach technique by a domain expert. This flight is a typical 
example of flights with unusual data patterns but without operational abnormality. 
 
 
Figure 5.29 Flight 1373774 - high wind approach 
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Operational characteristics of flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample 
 
Figure 5.30 Operational Characteristics of Flights Detected by Both ClusterAD-Flight and 
ClusterAD-Data Sample 
 
Operational characteristics of flights in this group are summarized in Figure 5.30. Three flights 
were chosen as examples to be discussed in this group: one example of strong indication of 
operational abnormality and hazardousness (Flight 1296837), one example of conflicting ratings 
(Flight 1320982), and one example of no identified operational abnormality and hazardousness 
(Flight 1209099). 
 
Flight 1296837 - unstabilized high energy approach 
Flight 1296837 was reviewed as operationally abnormal and representing safety hazards by all 
four domain experts. Information of key flight parameters of this flight is shown in Figure 5.31. 
This flight was commented as an unstabilized approach with high speed, late flap configuration 
and idle thrust until very short final. Its behavior was away from "normal" in terms of expected 
stabilized approach criteria at 1000 ft. One expert stated, “As a pilot and also as an operator I 
would consider this approach as requiring a go-around and it is an argument for the 1000ft HAT 
stabilized requirement but not all pilots or operators see it this way.” 
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Figure 5.31 Flight 1296837 - unstabilized high energy approach 
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Flight 1320982 – Strong tailwind and late localizer intercept approach 
Two experts considered this flight as operationally abnormal, while the other two experts 
didn’t agree. Only one expert thought this flight represented safety hazards. Experts who rated 
the flight as abnormal commented “Strange level off by 3 nm, late localizer intercept (less than 3 
miles) but no glideslope hold mode. “ and “Thrust was at idle until 2.5 miles on final. If we are in 
IMC, it would mean an unstabilized approach.” On the other hand, experts who viewed this flight 
as normal said “This approach was conducted with a strong tailwind but was close to stabilized by 
the 500ft point.” But expressed concerns on airspeed control between 4 and 3nm on the approach.  
 
 
Figure 5.32 Flight 1320982 - Strong tailwind & late localizer intercept approach 
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Flight 1209099 - manually-flown approach in cold weather 
All experts considered this flight as operationally normal. The flight was a manually-flown 
approach in cold weather based on the flight parameter information as shown in Figure 5.33. It 
was detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample because of the high air 
pressure. This is an example of flights with abnormal data pattern, but operationally normal. 
 
Figure 5.33 Flight 1209099 - manually-flown approach in cold weather 
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In summary, ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were able to detect flights that 
were operationally abnormal. However, the type of anomalies detected differed. Flights detected 
by ClusterAD-Flight exhibited more pattern-based anomalies. These anomalies had abnormal data 
patterns over the entire phase of flight and were more likely to be recognized as operationally 
abnormal. In contrast, flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample exhibited instantaneous 
anomalies. The abnormal flight parameters had spikes in their data-series. However, these 
instantaneous anomalies were not perceived as abnormal by operational standards. Flights 
detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were associated with a mix of 
pattern-based anomalies and instantaneous anomalies. These flights also had a higher inter-rater 
agreement, which indicates that a hybrid method with both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-
Data Sample might be more reliable. 
5.4.4 Results on Data Visualization Tools 
Using the standard usability questionnaire ASQ, three aspects of the data visualization tools 
were evaluated: ease of use, time required, and supporting information. Results are summarized in 
Figure 5.34, Figure 5.35 and Figure 5.36. Since the sample size is limited, no statistical tests were 
conducted. Only observations on the raw data are discussed here. 
The Flight Abnormality Visualization made the reviewing task easier and less time consuming. 
As shown in Figure 5.34 and Figure 5.35, Configuration A and B had less responses in “Disagree” 
regarding the question: “I am satisfied with the ease of completing the tasks” and the question: "I 
am satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the tasks.”  
The different types of flight parameter plot did not have an obvious impact on the ease of use 
and the time required. However, comparing Configuration A and Configuration B, some different 
opinions towards Configuration B were observed. It showed that some domain experts prefer a 
simpler graphic with only median plotted in Type II flight parameter plots, while some domain 
experts would like rich information on percentiles in Type I flight parameter plots. 
The supporting documents for the data visualization tools were perceived equally helpful 
across difference configurations.  
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Figure 5.34 Results on “Ease of Use” 
 
 
Figure 5.35 Results of “Time Required” 
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Figure 5.36 Results on “Supporting Information” 
 
5.4.5 Study Summary 
The results showed that both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were able to 
detect flights with operational significance, evaluated by domain experts. Some flights were agreed 
by all domain experts that they exhibited safety hazards. Thus, cluster-based anomaly detection 
algorithms could be used to detect flights with potential risks. 
The strengths and weakness of ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were revealed 
from the operational characteristics of flights detected by difference algorithms. ClusterAD-Flight 
was more sensitive to pattern-based anomalies with abnormal data patterns over the entire phase 
of flight. ClusterAD-Data Sample was more sensitive to instantaneous anomalies, which were often 
associated with spikes in the data-series of flight parameters. 
Flights detected by ClusterAD-Flight were more likely to be perceived as operationally 
abnormal by domain experts. In contrast, flights detected by ClusterAD-Data Sample with 
instantaneous anomalies were less likely to be agreed as abnormal by all domain experts.  
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Data visualization tools were shown to be effective in facilitating the expert review process. 
Especially, the benefit brought by the Flight Abnormality Visualization tool was significant. The 
Flight Abnormality Visualization tool helped domain experts quickly identify the resources of 
anomalies, which flight parameters at what time contributed to the abnormality in a flight. 
Subjective evaluations showed that the review process was easier and less time consuming with 
the Flight Abnormality Visualization tool.  This tool was enabled by ClusterAD-Data Sample. 
Thus, a hybrid method with both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample is expected 
to perform better. Flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were 
associated with a mix of pattern-based anomalies and instantaneous anomalies. These flights also 
had a higher inter-rater agreement. ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample could 
complement each other by detecting different types of anomalies. More importantly, both 
algorithms could complement existing methods by identifying emerging issues that were not 
accounted for in the past.   
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusions 
This thesis developed a new anomaly detection approach to support proactive safety 
management using airline’s daily operational FDR data. The new approach includes two 
components: cluster-based anomaly detection algorithms and domain experts review. The former 
identifies flights with abnormal data patterns from a large number of routine flights, while the 
later evaluates detected abnormal flights to determine operational significance. 
Two algorithms for cluster-based anomaly detection were developed to explore two types of 
cluster techniques: ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample. Both algorithms assume that a 
finite number of normal patterns exist in the FDR data of routine flights. These normal patterns 
can be recognized by cluster analysis, which are superior to existing methods since cluster-based 
anomaly detection algorithms can detect unknown issues without a specific definition of what 
“abnormal” is in advance. ClusterAD-Flight converts data of a flight for a specific phase into a 
form that is applicable for cluster analysis, while ClusterAD-Data Sample transforms data 
samples.  
In addition, new data visualization tools were developed to facilitate review processes. Flight 
Parameter Plots generate informative graphics to present raw FDR data in front of domain 
experts; Flight Abnormality Visualization can assist domain experts in identifying sources of 
anomalies quickly. These visualization tools have been confirmed by domain experts as effective in 
supporting the review process. 
Evaluation studies were conducted using airline FDR data. ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-
Data Sample were compared with Exceedance Detection, the current method in use by airlines, 
and MKAD, another anomaly detection algorithm developed at NASA, using a dataset of 25519 
A320 flights. An evaluation of the entire detection approach including detection algorithms and 
data visualization tools was conducted with domain experts using a dataset of 10,528 A320 flights.  
These evaluation studies resulted in several findings: 
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First, the cluster-based anomaly detection approach Sample was able to identify operationally 
significant anomalies that beyond the capacities of current methods; they could complement the 
current method of exceedance detection in order to identify new types of anomalies.  
Second, the data visualization tools, especially Flight Abnormality Visualization, were found 
to be effective in supporting the review process. Flight Abnormality Visualization enabled domain 
experts to quickly identify the resources of anomalies, which reduced the time needed to review a 
flight.  
Third, different data transformation techniques detected different types of anomalies. 
ClusterAD-Flight was more sensitive to pattern-based anomalies, which were abnormal patterns 
over a period of time and more likely to be perceived as operationally abnormal by domain 
experts. ClusterAD-Data Sample detected instantaneous anomalies better, which were less likely 
to be perceived as abnormal by domain experts. MKAD performed better at detecting abnormal 
sequences in discrete parameters.  
Forth, standard operations of flights could be identified by cluster analysis. Multiple standard 
operations during takeoff phase could be identified by ClusterAD-Flight. Moreover, aircraft 
operational modes across flight phases could be identified by ClusterAD-Data Sample.  
Lastly, a hybrid method with both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample is expected 
to perform better. Flights detected by both ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample were 
associated with a mix of pattern-based anomalies and instantaneous anomalies. These flights also 
had a higher inter-rater agreement. ClusterAD-Flight and ClusterAD-Data Sample could 
complement each other by detecting different types of anomalies, and the two could work together 
to complement existing methods by identifying emerging issues that were not accounted for in the 
past.   
In summary, the new cluster-based anomaly detection approach developed in this thesis 
provides a promising way to detect abnormal flights. It combines the strength of cluster-based 
algorithm with expert review and it can expose unknown safety concerns. This new approach can 
help airlines detect early signs of safety degradations, reveal latent risks, deploy predictive 
maintenance, and train staff accordingly.  
141 
 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
The new approach developed in this thesis is yet to be implemented in real-world operations 
and more research efforts are needed before it is integrated with current FOQA program. A set of 
comprehensive tools are needed to support expert review. Details of a review protocol need to be 
developed to address the subjective variations across domain experts.  
The research can be extended to make the new approach applicable to all phases of flight. 
Currently, ClusterAD-Flight is limited to takeoff and approach phase and ClusterAD-Data Sample 
has only been tested to these two phases as well. Given the diversity of temporal patterns in other 
flight phases, this limit can be overcome by anchoring raw FDR data and making data patterns of 
different flights comparable.  
Another direction is to develop reinforcement learning capabilities, where initial reviews can 
inform recurrent reviews with established baselines. Assuming the new approach has been adopted 
by airlines with reinforcement learning capability, review results from domain experts can be 
dynamically incorporated into baselines. In this way, abnormal flights of identical symptoms can 
be categorized automatically without repeated expert review.  
A third direction is to analyze data from sources other than FDR data, such as maintenance 
records, pilot voluntary reports, and weather reports. Combing information from multiple sources 
allows airlines to upgrade anomaly detection method into a diagnostic system. It can easier 
identify abnormality with operational significance as well as its causes, thus answering the “what” 
and the “why” questions at the same time.  
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